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I. Introduction
A search for marketing tricks in blogs and online newspapers yields an abounding number
of tipps (to firms) and warnings (to consumers) about consumer manipulation. A recurring
story is about the “anchoring decoy”: When US kitchenware retailer Williams-Sonoma saw
their breadmaker at $279 flopping, they offered, next to it, a larger model priced at $429,
and sales on the $279 model picked up. Since then, putting an over-priced decoy next
to a product with similar features to make customers believe the latter to be a bargain
has become a (reportedly) widely used marketing strategy.1 Similar strategies make use of
what is sometimes labelled the “middling effect” (customers shy away from extreme prices
and go for the middle-priced option) or the “everyone-loves-a-deal effect” (add a crossed-
out price on the price tag that exceeds the offer price and make the product look as if on
sale, i.e., a “bargain”). Taking a more general viewpoint, the marketing literature speaks
of “atmospheric effects” when it reports how the grouping of merchandise, color schemes,
lighting, price displays, music, scents and other variables at the point of purchase affect
shopping behavior.2 Although brandished under a variety of labels, such marketing tricks
boil down to the usage of one habit of mind: to assess the properties of products relative to
the immediate environment in which they are presented. In short, context matters.
At first sight, such marketing tricks look intuitive. However, even accepting that pur-
chase decisions are affected by context, it is far from straightforward that such manipulations
survive competition. We show that such tricks play a role even in perfectly competitive re-
tail markets because consumers typically need to enter the store of a particular firm before
being able to buy a product: An internet shopper, for instance, can browse and compare the
product-lines of different online stores using price comparison websites such as PriceGrabber
and Google Shopping, but ultimately has to enter a store—say, amazon.com—to purchase a
product. This structure gives individual retailers (even perfectly competitive ones) consider-
able power over the design of the final choice environment. If consumers are context-sensitive
and underestimate the degree to which their preferences are malleable, firms will use this
power to establish choice environments that induce consumers to purchase more profitable
products than they intended to buy when entering the store.
To show formally how retail firms use context to manipulate consumer choice we develop
a model that introduces context-sensitivity into a standard competitive retail market. In
our model, there is only one good, but this good can be differentiated in quality and price.
1This story occurs, for example, on https://www.quora.com/What-psychological-tricks-do-retailers-use-
to-get-people-to-spend-more-money, accessed 20-09-2016.
2For a review of experimental marketing research on the effects of “atmosheric variables” on shopping
behavior, see, for example, Turley and Milliman (2000).
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Market supply of the good is competitive: There is a large number of (ex-ante symmet-
ric) firms that each can offer any menu of quality-price combinations—a product-line—at
a firm-specific store (for example, a website or a supermarket). When making a purchase
decision, consumers first compare the product-lines on offer and then enter the store of one
firm to purchase a product. We introduce context-sensitivity by assuming that the choice
environment at any given store can lead the consumer to overvalue by a factor β either the
quality of a product (leading to the distorted value function βqj − pj) or its price (leading
to the distorted value function qj − βpj).
We show that when a firm has the power to manipulate the choice-environment of its
store and consumers underestimate the extent to which their preferences are malleable, the
firm will attract consumers with a competitive attraction product but design a store-context
that induces them to switch to a more profitable target. Such strategies are profitable at the
margin because they allow firms to compete for consumers on a set of preferences that is
different from the preferences at the moment of purchase. Our model thereby predicts the
widespread marketing practice of using variations in the presentation of options to “up-sell”
or “down-sell” a customer, i.e., making the customer purchase a product of higher price
(up-sale) or lower cost (down-sale). While the incentives to manipulate context are strong,
fierce competition for consumer entry leads firms to compete away the extra profits earned
on such manipulation. As a result, the attraction product becomes a so-called “loss leader”,
i.e., a product priced below marginal costs.
To make more explicit predictions with regard to how firms manipulate the choice envi-
ronment, we embed and compare three recently suggested theories of choice-set dependent
preferences: Salience (Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2013, henceforth BGS), Focusing
(Ko˝szegi and Szeidl, 2013, henceforth KS), and Relative Thinking (Bushong, Rabin and
Schwartzstein, 2016, henceforth BRS). These theories have in common that they make pref-
erences at the store dependent on whether quality or price of a product stands out in con-
trast to the firm’s entire product-line. While the three frameworks are very different in their
particular definition of how the choice-set affects consumer attention and thus preferences,
we show that all of them allow firms to profitably manipulate preferences by inflating the
product-line with unattractive products. The characteristics of these products mirror the
construction of so-called decoys in classical experiments on context-effects (see e.g., Huber,
Payne and Puto, 1982; Simonson, 1989). Under all three specifications, firms in equilibrium
use product-lines that include exactly one such decoy. This decoy is necessary and sufficient
to shift preferences at the store from the attraction product to the target.
We also show that sophisticated agents and agents who overestimate their response to
contextual clues will not be up- or down-sold in equilibrium. Firms react to these consumers
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as if their preferences were stable and undistorted. Our predictions do not change when
consumers who are prone to profitable deception and those who are not co-exist in the
population. In equilibrium, the market perfectly separates the former from the latter: While
consumers who underestimate the malleability of their preferences will always be deceived
by firms that use context to up- or down-sell, there also exist firms that offer undistorted
product-lines where types who “see through” the up- and down-selling regimes of deceptive
firms can purchase a product that is aligned with their outside preference.
Related Literature. Theoretical contributions dealing with the question of how firms react
to context-sensitivity in market settings are rare. Kamenica (2008) considers a monopolistic
seller and shows that consumers with choice-set dependent preferences need not necessarily
exhibit a behavioral “mistake”. In particular, if a consumer is imperfectly informed about
the quality of a product, then it can be rational to update her valuation once she faces the
product-line. This is because the popularity of products can reveal something about their
quality (given that there are also better informed consumers in the market). Kamenica (2008)
shows that, given that there is also uncertainty about the production cost, a monopolist may
be able to “manipulate” the quality-perception of rational, uninformed consumers by adding
decoy products to the product-line. While this is an important result that sheds new light
on the importance of consumer inference, it is definitely not the end of the story. Context-
effects have been found in experimental settings with no explanatory room for inference,
see, e.g., Herne (1999), Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec (2003), Mazar, Ko˝szegi and Ariely
(2014) and Jahedi (2011). Moreover, the conjecture that context-sensitive shopping behavior
is largely irrational seems corroborated by the extensive on-line discussion of marketing
techniques that all seem to “manipulate” or “trick” consumers into purchase decisions. Thus,
while it is plausible that context-sensitivity evolutionary originates from rational inference—
representing a heuristic that is often true and time-efficient (see also Wolfe and Horowitz,
2004)—, it is even more prevalent in situations where it cannot be rationalized. We therefore
believe that a behavioral model of firms using context to exploit na¨ıve consumers is required
to round out the picture of how context-sensitivity affects market outcomes. Our paper
provides one such model which is, in addition, sufficiently general to nest three popular ways
of modeling context-sensitivity.
The paper closest to ours is “Competition for Attention” by Bordalo, Gennaioli and
Shleifer (2016). In this paper, the authors assume that consumers have context-dependent
preferences according to the Salience theory and study the price-quality competition of single-
product duopolists on a “direct” market, i.e., where consumers buy products without entering
the store of a particular firm. The main results of our paper, on the other hand, stem from
the possibility of firms to offer multiple products and the observation that preferences may
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change after entering the store of a particular firm. We consider the Salience theory, but also
other approaches to modeling context-sensitivity. An approach to context that is structurally
different to ours is followed by Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Spiegler (2014). In these
papers the authors assume that the way how firms describe their products (when attracting
consumers) can affect the ability of consumers to compare the products of different firms.
We are interested, on the other hand, in how firms present their products at the moment
of purchase (i.e., after consumers have been attracted). In our framework, consumers are
always able to compare the products of all firms, but this comparison may be defective
when—due to store-context—consumers have wrong expectations about their preferences
over the product-lines of some stores.
There are other, less immediate relations to the existing literature. Due to its 2-period
choice structure with preference inconsistencies our model is (from a technical standpoint)
related to models of contracting with time-inconsistent consumers (see, e.g., DellaVigna
and Malmendier, 2004, 2006; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2010; Got-
tlieb, 2008; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006). Some of our findings parallel theirs. For example,
we find that (context-induced) time-inconsistency influences market outcomes if and only
if consumers underestimate the effect of this bias on their future choices. This mirrors
results of Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2010). Our result that competitive firms attract na¨ıve,
time-inconsistent consumers with loss-leader products mirrors results by DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2004, 2006). Importantly, while this literature considers an exogeneous source
of time-inconsistency, it arises endogenously in our model from the equilibrium decision of
firms to manipulate context at the point of purchase. It is interesting to see that the common
retail market structure allows for a similar exploitation of incorrect consumer expectations
as a contract environment.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
introduce the formal model in the next section. In section III. we first derive the rational
benchmark and then carve out the major impact of assuming context-sensitivity in retail
markets, which is the possibility of firms to “fool” (i.e., up- or down-sell) na¨ıve consumers.
We also show in this section how the feasibility and profitability of such strategies depends
on the na¨ıvete´ of consumers and the type of choice-environment that the firm selects. Section
IV. addresses the questions of what environment firms will construct in equilibrium and how
such context is constructed when it is a function of the choice-set, as suggested by the theories
of Salience (BGS), Focusing (KS) and Relative Thinking (BRS). Section V. concludes and
relates our results to anecdotal and empirical evidence from actual retail markets. All proofs
are in the appendix.
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II. The Model
II.A. The Market
A unit mass of consumers has demand for a good that can be differentiated in quality q ∈ R
and price p ∈ R, where quality and price are both measured in dollars. There is a minimum
quality q > 0 and a maximum price b > 0 agents are willing to accept. Each consumer
demands one good. There is a large number K of firms in the market. Each firm k owns
a store. To purchase from firm k, a consumer has to enter its store. At the store, the firm
can offer any menu of products Jk. Each product j ∈ Jk implements the good at some level
of quality qj ∈ R and price pj ∈ R. The set M
k = ((qj, pj))j∈JK is called the product-line
of firm k. Each firm k also chooses how to present its product-line to consumers who enter
its store. This choice is represented by the variable Θk, which we call the store-context of
firm k. (We define Θk in detail further below). Instead of entering a store and purchasing a
product, consumers can select an outside option of no purchase. The sequence of events is
as follows.
• Firms simultaneously commit to a product-line Mk and a store-context Θk.
• Each consumer then moves in two stages:
– Stage 1: The consumer observes the product-linesMk of all firms and then decides
to enter one store to make a purchase or to exercise the outside option and leave
the market without purchase.
– Stage 2: If the consumer has entered store k, she selects a product j ∈ Jk in
context Θk.
II.B. Context-Sensitive Consumers
When evaluating products outside of a firm-specific store, consumers value a product of given
quality and price at all firms equally. Without loss of generality (henceforth w.l.o.g.), let
this “global” surplus function be given by
uj = qj − pj.(1)
We assume (w.l.o.g.) that the outside option of no purchase yields surplus u0 = 0. Inside a
firm-specific store, the “local” valuation of firm k’s products may differ from Equation (1)
due to the consumer now being exposed to the local context of the store: Let Θk be a vector
that has as many entries as the firm has products in the product-line (i.e., |Θk| = |Jk|).
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Element θkj ∈ Θ
k identifies the effect of local context at store k—for instance, the color
of price-tags or the relative position of product j in the product-line—on the valuation of
product j. We assume, in particular, that store-context can either increase the perceived
quality (θkj = Q) or the perceived price (θ
k
j = P ) of a product, thereby leading to an inflation
or deflation of product value relative to Equation (1). If the local context at store k has
no influence on the valuation of product j, we write θkj = N . With a given context Θ
k,
consumers then value products j ∈ Jk inside store k with the surplus function
uˆkj =
!""""#
""""$
qj − pj if θ
k
j = N,
βqj − pj if θ
k
j = Q,
qj − βpj if θ
k
j = P,
(2)
where β ≥ 1 measures the size of contextual distortions; the possibility of β = 1 nests the
rational model.3
When making their entry decision in stage 1, consumers observe the product-lines of all
stores and form an expectation about their purchase in stage 2. This expectation depends,
of course, on the consumer’s awareness of possible preference distortions at the store. We
allow for different types. A perfectly sophisticated type knows Θk and β, and will therefore
always predict her behavior correctly. On the other end is a perfectly na¨ıve type who is
either (completely) unaware of context-effects or (falsely) believes that her valuations are
consistent across different contexts. We capture these two extremes as well as their convex
hull by assuming that all consumers are aware of the environment at firm k (and thus of
Θk), but are heterogeneous regarding their belief about the size of parameter β. Specifically,
each consumer has a point-belief E(β) = β˜ and predicts herself to value products inside of
store k with the surplus function
Eβ˜
%
uˆkj
&
= uˆkj |β=β˜.(3)
The distribution of types in the population is F (β˜), with density f(β˜). We assume f(β˜) = 0
for any β˜ ≤ 1, which implies that agents may mispredict the size of contextual distortions,
but not the direction. The lower bound β˜ = 1 identifies the perfectly na¨ıve type. Note
that any type β˜ ∕= β is partially na¨ıve. We subdivide na¨ıves into optimists (β˜ < β), who
underestimate the effect of context on their choice and pessimists (β˜ > β), who overestimate
3Note, importantly, that we do not claim that the outside assessment of products is free of distortions.
The crucial element of our model is not the particular form of Equation (1), but that—once that consumers
have entered the store—preferences may change relative to this outside assessment. Our results go through
for any limitation of “local” context effects to small values, i.e., for any β arbitrarily close to 1.
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this effect. This categorization will play an important effect for market supply in equilibrium.
II.C. Firms
Each firm maximizes its profit πk by choosing a product-line and a context for its store. For
large parts of the paper it will be sufficient to consider a reduced form model, where the
firm chooses the distortion Θk (i.e., whether a product is quality- or price-inflated inside the
store) directly. This allows us to capture the effect of environmental variables on consumer
choice in a very general manner. When solving the model, we first consider the direct choice
of Θk under different technological restrictions (section IV.A.) and then consider an extended
model where context Θk is a function of the product-line Mk (section IV.B.).
Throughout the paper, firms simultaneously commit to a (finite) menu of products Mk
(with (qj, pj) ∈ R
2) and a context Θk before consumers move. We assume that firms—e.g.,
through historical observations of consumer choice—have perfect knowledge of the context-
sensitivity parameter β and of the distribution of beliefs F (β˜), but cannot observe the type
of individual consumers. Firms have symmetric cost-functions. When a consumer purchases
a good of quality q from firm k, the firm incurs a cost c(q) that we assume is strictly convex
increasing in the quality delivered, c′(q) > 0, c′′(q) > 0, and satisfies c(0) = c′(0) = 0. These
standard (Inada) conditions imply that for a given (context-dependent) surplus function
(see Equation (2)) there exists a unique, strictly positive quality qcj that is cost-efficient. In
particular,
qcj =
!""""""#
""""""$
q∗ := argmax
q
[q − c(q)] ⇔ c′(qc) = 1 if θkj = N,
qQ := argmax
q
[βq − c(q)]⇔ c′(qc) = β if θkj = Q,
qP := argmax
q
[q − βc(q)]⇔ c′(qc) =
1
β
if θkj = P.
Note that qQ > q∗ > qP > 0. We concentrate on interior results by demanding that
minimum quality q is sufficiently low and maximum willingness to pay b sufficiently high
that consumers do not per-se reject buying cost-efficient quality qcj at cost. This is true with
any context-effect θkj ∈ {N,Q, P} iff q ≤ q
P and b ≥ c(qQ), which we assume henceforth.
Finally, we assume that any distortion of context (choosing a store context other than θkj = N
∀j ∈ Jk) entails a positive but infinitely small cost as does the inclusion of one additional
product in the product-line.4
4This assumption sustains the results of an analysis without set-up costs but requires that firms distort
context or add products only if this has non-zero marginal effect on profits. This helps us to define equilibria
that pin down store-context and the size of product-lines exactly.
8
II.D. Solution Concept
We analyze market supply in the competitive equilibrium, where the latter is defined as as
a tuple (M ,Θ),M := (Mk)k=1,...,K , Θ := (Θ
k)k=1,...,K , with the following properties:
1. (Nash Equilibrium) Firms play mutual best responses. For every k ∈ {1, ..., K},
πk((Mk,Θk), (M−k,Θ−k)) ≥ πk((Mk
′
,Θk
′
), (M−k,Θ−k) ∀(Mk
′
,Θk
′
) ∕= (Mk,Θk).
2. (Competitive Market) For every k ∈ {1, ..., K}, πk((Mk,Θk), (M−k,Θ−k)) = 0.
To resolve possible tie-breaks, we make two assumptions. First, whenever indifferent,
a consumer chooses each surplus-maximizing option with positive probability. Second, we
assume that there exists a smallest monetary unit δ > 0, which we take to be positive but
infinitesimally small.5 This is equivalent to assuming that a firm, when best-responding,
can resolve tie-breaks in favor of the strictly more profitable product. We will exploit this
equivalence when solving the model.
III. Setting the Stage
In this section, we first provide a rational benchmark against which to compare our later
results by solving the model for the case of β = 1. We then work-out the main impact of
assuming context-sensitivity (β > 1) on the store-level: Firms can use the design of a store
to sell na¨ıve consumers a product that is different to the product they were attracted with.
We show that such a “fooling strategy” is only profitable when attracting na¨ıves who prior to
entering the store underestimate the effect of store-context on their choice (i.e., optimists).
We also detail what type of distortion Θk (quality- vs. price-inflating) is profitable in such
a case (Lemma 3). When no optimistic consumers exists who can be profitably fooled, the
market outcome does not change from the rational benchmark (Proposition 1).
III.A. Rational Benchmark
When consumers are not sensitive to store context, our set-up yields a standard Bertrand
outcome. Assume that β = 1. This is equivalent to assuming that valuations are undistored
(θkj = N for all j and k): Preferences are stable and for both stages (outside and inside
stores) uniquely defined by Equation (1). Neither the two-step choice of consumers nor
potential na¨ıvete´ is relevant in such a case because every consumer perfectly predicts her
5Formally, let δ = 1
10z
where z ∈ Z is an integer. Firms then choose qualities and prices from a discretized
set of real numbers Rz = {r ∈ R|(r · 10
z) ∈ Z}. In the limit z →∞ (i.e., δ → 0+) this set is equal to R.
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behavior in stage 2: The choice of a store is equivalent with the choice of a final product.
A market so defined generates standard Bertrand incentives: Firms compete by offering a
single product with cost-efficient quality q∗ at a price that marginally undercuts the price
of other competitors. The firms with the lowest price win all consumers. In equilibrium, at
least two firms will offer q∗ at marginal cost c(q∗) and share the market. In this situation,
the only other choice that yields zero profit (by avoiding any positive costs) is to choose
(Mk,Θk) = ∅. It follows:
Lemma 1 (Rational Benchmark) If consumers are not context-sensitive (β = 1), a com-
petitive equilibrium exists. In any such equilibrium, at least 2 firms share the market, each
firm offering 1 product with quality q∗ at marginal cost c∗ = c(q∗). All other firms choose
Mk = ∅.
III.B. Attraction and Fooling
For the rest of the paper, let β > 1 such that preferences are sensitive to the context in
which products are presented at the point of purchase. Having consumers first select a store
and then a product may now have important consequences for market supply. To see this,
note that consumers are attracted to a store by the product they expect to purchase. If
a consumer is na¨ıve regarding future preference changes, this product must not necessarily
conform to the product the consumer will ultimately purchase. We therefore define:
Definition 1 (Attraction Product) We call product j ∈ Jk an attraction product a(β˜)
of firm k if and only if a consumer of type β˜ expects to purchase product j when entering
store k.
Definition 2 (Target) We call product j ∈ Jk the target t of firm k if and only if a
consumer who enters store k purchases product j.
Of course, sophisticated consumers perfectly foresee their behavior at the store implying
that for these consumers the firm’s target is also the attraction product. In particular, these
consumers enter store k iff target t is feasible (pt ≤ b and qt ≥ q) and provides at least as
high (undistorted) surplus as any other firm’s target. If a consumer is na¨ıve, however, she is
prone to mispredicting her choice at a store where preferences are distorted by local context.
In this case, the consumer might be attracted to a store by a product that is not the target.
If a firm designs a store that attracts type β˜ ∕= β with a product that is not the target, we
say that the firm fools the consumer.
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Definition 3 (Fooling) Firm k fools type β˜ if and only if a(β˜) ∕= t. If firm k fools type β˜,
uˆkt ≥ uˆ
k
a(β˜)(IC)
Eβ˜
%
uˆkt
&
≤ Eβ˜
%
uˆk
a(β˜)
&
(PCC)
with at least one of the inequalities being strict.
In this definition, condition (IC) is a standard incentive compatibility constraint: In-
side store k, the consumer weakly prefers the target over the attraction product. Condi-
tion (PCC), on the other hand, is what we call a perceived choice constraint: When entering
store k, a consumer with expectation E(β) = β˜ ∕= β (falsely) expects to weakly prefer the
attraction product over the target. Before we move to the analysis of fooling in detail, the
following two points deserve mention:
Remark 1 (Rational Benchmark) If consumers are not context-sensitive (β = 1), valu-
ations are consistent across stages. Then no type β˜ can be fooled.
Remark 2 (The Sole Function of Store-Context is Fooling) If a(β˜) = t for all β˜ ∈
supp[f(β˜)], then the firm cannot improve by distorting preferences.
To see why Remark 2 must be true, assume that firm k does not fool. Then a(β˜) = t for
all β˜ ∈ supp[f(β˜)]. The entire consumer population then correctly expects to purchase the
target and receive (undistorted) surplus ut = qt− pt at store k, even if store-context Θ
k may
distort valuations ex-post. It follows that the profit-maximal choice of quality and price is
already determined by the outside valuation of products, implying that store-context cannot
affect the best response.
III.C. Who is susceptible to fooling attempts?
It is clear that any na¨ıve consumer can be fooled by a suitable choice of product-line Mk
and preference distortion Θk. However, fooling may not always be more profitable for a firm
than the standard Bertrand strategy of undercutting competitors with a single competitively
priced product. We want to understand under which circumstances a fooling strategy indeed
yields higher profits and may therefore be used in equilibrium. As a first step, in the
next lemma we highlight important structural differences between a store-design that fools
consumers who overestimate their sensitivity to context (pessimists) and a store-design that
fools consumer who underestimate this sensitivity (optimists).
Lemma 2 (Na¨ıvete´ and Fooling) Let β > 1. Let product t be the target of firm k. As-
sume that the firm fools consumers of type β˜0 by attracting them with product a ∕= t. Then
it is true that
• Store-context distorts valuations of at least one of the two products: (θa, θt) ∕= (N,N).
• The fooled consumer is (partially) na¨ıve regarding contextual distortions: β˜0 ∕= β.
a) Pessimists and optimists cannot be fooled by the same pair of products (a, t):
If the fooled consumer is pessimistic (β˜0 > β), other pessimistic types may be attracted
by product a ∕= t, but optimistic consumer always correctly expect to prefer the target.
In particular, ∀β˜ < β, Eβ˜
%
uˆkt
&
> Eβ˜
%
uˆka
&
.
If the fooled consumer is optimistic (β˜0 < β), other optimistic types may be attracted
by product a ∕= t, but pessimistic consumers always correctly expect to prefer the target.
In particular, ∀β˜ > β, Eβ˜
%
uˆkt
&
> Eβ˜
%
uˆka
&
.
b) Being fooled increases undistorted surplus for pessimists, but lowers it for optimists:
If the fooled consumer is pessimistic (β˜0 > β), she receives higher undistorted surplus
than expected. In particular, ut > ua.
If the fooled consumer is optimistic (β˜0 < β), she receives lower undistorted surplus
than expected. In particular, ut < ua.
Above lemma presents two important auxiliary results: Part a) implies that one group
of na¨ıves (pessimists or optimists) always “see through” a deceptive strategy that is meant
to fool the other group. Unless a firm designs separate attraction products for each type
(say, a1 ∕= t for optimists and a2 ∕= t for pessimists), there is always one group of consumers
that is not fooled but correctly expects to purchase the target when entering the store. This
result will be important later when we characterize the equilibrium for “mixed” populations
where both groups co-exist. Part b), on the other hand, relates the sign of na¨ıvete´ (pessimist
or optimist) to the question of whether fooling is profitable: When fooled, consumers who
underestimate their sensitivity to context purchase a product of lower undistorted surplus
than expected (ut < ua). Intuition suggests that firms may be able to extract some of this
“lost” surplus in the form of positive fooling profits. On the other hand, when pessimistic
consumers (β˜ > β) are fooled, ut > ua, suggesting that the deception of those consumers
is not profitable. The next lemma confirms this intuition: Part a) establishes that firms
must always lower the selling price of a target in order to fool pessimists. It follows that a
standard Bertrand strategy (without fooling the consumer) is more profitable when selling to
12
this group of na¨ıves. Conversely, part b) establishes that fooling can yield higher profits than
a Bertrand strategy when selling to optimists. However, not every distortion of preferences
yields a profitable fooling outcome: To be able to sell a given target at a higher price than
with a standard Bertrand strategy, the distortion Θk must increase the perceived surplus of
the target relative to the attraction product. Only then will the consumer be induced to
switch away from a competitively priced attraction product and be willing to purchase the
more profitable target. We show in Lemma 3 part b) what this implies for the choice of
distortions θa and θt (the effect of context on the valuation of the attraction product and the
target) and how this relates to whether the consumer will be up-sold (qt > qa) or down-sold
(qt < qa) as a result.
Lemma 3 (Profitable Fooling) Let β > 1. Assume w.l.o.g. that b → ∞. Fix any target
quality qt ≥ q. If firm k does not fool, the maximum price the firm can sell quality qt to
consumers of type β˜0 is
p0t := qt − u¯(β˜
0),
where u¯(β˜0) ≥ 0 is the highest undistorted surplus that a consumer with belief β˜0 expects to
receive when not shopping at store k. Compare this to a fooling strategy where firm k attracts
type β˜0 with a different product a ∕= t. Then it is true that:
a) If type β˜0 is pessimistic (β˜0 > β), fooling her is unprofitable: Conditional on selling
target t ∕= a, the firm must charge a price pt that is strictly lower than p
0
t .
b) If type β˜0 is optimistic (β˜0 < β), fooling her is profitable:
• If store-context inflates qualities, (θa, θt) = (Q,Q) and the target has higher quality
than the attraction product, qt > qa (i.e., the firm up-sells), or
• If store-context inflates prices, (θa, θt) = (P, P ) and the target has lower price than
the attraction product, pt < pa (i.e., the firm down-sells), or
• If store-context asymmetrically distorts surplus in favor of the target,
(θa, θt) ∈ {(P,Q), (P,N), (N,Q)},
the firm can sell target t ∕= a at a price pt that is strictly higher than p
0
t .
Moreover, fooling with other store-contexts is unprofitable. In particular, if store-
context asymmetrically distorts surplus in favor of the attraction product, (θa, θt) ∈
{(Q,P ), (Q,N), (N,P )}, the consumer cannot be fooled to purchase target t at any pt ≥ 0.
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We end this section by characterizing the equilibrium for populations that consist en-
tirely of consumers that are either impossible to fool or do not lend themselves to profitable
fooling strategies: sophisticated and pessimistic consumers. When faced with such popula-
tions, firms maximize profit by behaving identical to standard Bertrand competitors, i.e.,
by offering a single, cost-efficient product at the lowest competitive price. In equilibrium,
context-sensitivity will then be rendered inconsequential for market supply:
Proposition 1 (Sophistication and pessimism induces the rational outcome) If
consumers are context-sensitive (β > 1), but (weakly) overestimate their sensitivity to
context (β˜ ≥ β for all consumers), market supply is identical to the rational benchmark.
Lemma 3 implies, on the other hand, that consumers who underestimate the malleability
of their preferences (β˜ < β) will be fooled if firms have the possibility to design a store-
context that distorts preferences. We turn to the question of how such context may be
constructed and define the equilibrium for populations that are profitable to fool in the next
section.
IV. Equilibrium with Na¨ıve Populations
Consider a na¨ıve consumer that lends himself to profitable fooling. A store may try to
influence the consumer in many different ways. For instance, it may try to use the color of
price-tags to influence the perception and thus, the valuation of prices. Or, it may spray
a certain perfume at the store entrance and hope that this leads the consumer to spend
more money on quality. Meyers-Levy, Zhu and Jiang (2010) report, for example, that tactile
properties of the flooring of a store (e.g., whether it is hard or soft) can affect the quality-
assessment of products. While we desire to keep our model as general as possible, we also
wish to be more specific about the construction of context. In particular, we aim at findings
for a range of recent, much-attended models suggesting that consumers overweight that
attribute of a product that “stands out” in the choice-set: the Salience model by BGS, the
Focusing model by KS, and the model of Relative Thinking by BRS. These models make
consumer attention and thus, distortions θkj , a function of the product-line of firm k.
Our approach is as follows: In a first step, we keep the assumption that Θk is a direct
choice-variable of the firm. The technology to manipulate context is thus assumed indepen-
dent of the product-line and might as well be the color of price-tags, the spraying of perfume,
or decisions about the tactile properties of flooring. Under the assumption that firms choose
Θk directly, in section IV.A. we explore two possible assumptions regarding technological
restrictions: (1) Contextual distortions are store-wide: For any two products j, j′ at a given
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firm k, θkj = θ
k
j′ = θ
k and firms can choose θk ∈ {Q,P,N} and (2) Contextual distortions
are product-specific: Firms can choose θkj ∈ {Q,P,N} for each product individually. We
show that under both assumptions, the unique equilibrium strategy when consumers un-
derestimate contextual distortions (β˜ < β) is a fooling strategy that uses context to up-
or down-sell. In a second step, we nest the models of Salience (BGS), Focusing (KS) and
Relative Thinking (BRS) in our framework and make Θk a function of the product-line. We
show that in this case, firms achieve the profit-maximizing distortion by adding one addi-
tional product to their product-line. This decoy shifts consumer attention at the store to
the the advantageous attribute of the target and thereby enables the fooling outcome. We
show in detail where this decoy needs to be located in price-quality space according to each
of the three models.
We assume for most of this section that all consumers are optimistic (β˜ < β) and thus,
are susceptible to profitable fooling attempts by firms. We return to the more general case
of a “mixed” population at the end of this section where we define the equilibrium for
societies where optimistic as well as sophisticated/pessimistic consumers co-exist. Outcomes
and market-supply for each group of consumers will be unaffected by this co-existence: Our
results for an entirely optimistic population (which we present next) will therefore continue
to hold (for the optimistic part of society) in the general case.
IV.A. Firms Choose Context Directly
We present the central result of our paper below. The proposition characterizes the equilib-
rium when firms have an unspecified technology at hand that lets them choose the context
of their store Θk. We show in a later proposition that this result also characterizes market
supply when store-context is endogenous to the product-line and follows the Salience (BGS),
Focusing (KS) and Relative Thinking (RT) frameworks.
Proposition 2 (Fooling Equilibrium) Assume that consumers are context-sensitive
(β > 1), and underestimate their sensitivity to context (β˜ < β for all consumers).
a) (Store-Wide Distortions.) Assume that for any two products j, j′ at a given firm k,
θkj = θ
k
j′ = θ
k and firms choose θk ∈ {Q,P,N}. A competitive equilibrium exists. In any
such equilibrium, at least 2 firms share the market, each firm offering 2 products, t and
a ∕= t. All other firms choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅. Let
ν(Q,Q) := [qQ − c(qQ)] + (β − 1)(qQ − q), and
ν(P,P ) := [qP − c(qP )] + (β − 1)[b− c(qP )].
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• If ν(Q,Q) > ν(P,P ), a firm with strictly positive demand chooses θk = Q, sells quality
qt = q
Q > q∗ at marginal cost pt = c(q
Q), but attracts with quality qa = q < qt at
price pa = c(q
Q)− β(qQ − q) < pt. The firm up-sells. Note that pa < c(qa).
• If ν(Q,Q) < ν(P,P ), a firm with strictly positive demand chooses θk = P , sells quality
qt = q
P < q∗ at marginal cost pt = c(q
P ), but attracts with quality qa = q
P + β[b −
c(qP )] > qt at price pa = b > pt. The firm down-sells. Note that pa < c(qa).
• If ν(Q,Q) = ν(P,P ), a firm with strictly positive demand chooses θk, (qt, pt) and (qa, pa)
according to one of the two cases described above.
b) (Product-Specific Distortions) Assume that firms choose θkj ∈ {Q,P,N} for each
product j ∈ Jk individually. A competitive equilibrium exists. In any such equilibrium,
at least 2 firms share the market, each firm offering 2 products, t and a ∕= t. All other
firms choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅. A firm with strictly positive demand chooses Θk = (θa, θt) =
(P,Q), sells quality qt = q
Q > q∗ at marginal cost pt = c(q
Q), but attracts with quality
qa = β(q
Q + b) − c(qQ) > qt at price pa = b > pt. The firm down-sells. Note that
pa < c(qa).
In the following, we provide a comprehensive intuition for this result and highlight im-
portant observations and predictions. Note first that Lemma 3 implies that the equilibrium
must involve fooling: When consumers underestimate context effects (β˜ < β), fooling is
more profitable than any truthful sales strategy. If firms can distort context, they will do so
and fool. We now explain the structure of optimal (i.e., equilibrium) fooling strategies.
Understanding consumers: Context-induced switching surplus. For a firm that fools,
profit-maximization implies that perceived surplus of the target at the store is identical to
the perceived surplus of the attraction product at the store, i.e., uˆka = uˆ
k
t .
6 This condition
can be transformed into ua = ut + [(uˆ
k
t − ut)− (uˆ
k
a − ua)], or
ua ≡ ν
(θa,θt) := ut'()*
undistorted surplus of target
+ (β − 1)
!""""#
""""$
(qt − qa) if (θa, θt) = (Q,Q),
(pa − pt) if (θa, θt) = (P, P ),
(qt + pa) if (θa, θt) = (P,Q).' () *
context-dependent (virtual) surplus from switching to target
(4)
Expression (4) has an intriguing interpretation: Because ua is the expected surplus at
store k, a fooled consumer behaves as if she was maximizing undistorted surplus ut plus a
6If this was not the case, the firm could increase the target’s price pt or decrease its quality qt and thereby
increase profits.
16
term that measures the context-dependent subjective benefit of “changing her mind” when
switching from product a to product t. If (θa, θt) = (Q,Q), this relative advantage comes
from switching to a product of higher quality. If (θa, θt) = (P, P ), the consumer perceives a
“bargain effect” when switching from the expensive product to the cheaper option. Finally,
if the distortion is asymmetric, (θa, θt) = (P,Q), the effect is a combination of perceived
bargain (not purchasing product a) and quality-increase (purchasing t). Most intuitively,
this context-induced (virtual) surplus—and therefore the incentive of firms to fool—increases
in the size of the context-sensitivity parameter β.
Marketing and the choice of attraction products. For a given target, maximizing profit
means choosing an attraction product that maximizes the virtual surplus of switching to
this target at the store. A different contextual distortion might therefore call for a different
“marketing” (i.e., attraction) strategy. If (θa, θt) = (Q,Q), a firm achieves the highest profit
when attracting the consumer with the lowest quality possible, qa = q, while competing with
other firms on price pa. If (θa, θt) ∈ {(P, P ), (P,Q)}, the bargain effect is maximized by
fixing pa at the maximum acceptable price b and competing with other firms on quality qa.
The lower is q or the higher is b, the more extreme are the products with which firms attract
consumers to their store.
Cost-efficiency and the choice of targets. While the optimal attraction product is either
a “top-of-the-range” (price pa = b) or “budget” (quality qa = q) option, the optimal target
is a product that lies somewhere in the middle. In particular, when the target is quality-
inflated—i.e., if (θa, θt) ∈ {(Q,Q), (P,Q)}—, selling quality qt =q
Q := argmaxq[βq − c(q)] is
cost-efficient, while if the price of the target is inflated, selling qt = q
P := argmaxq[q−βc(q)]
is cost-efficient. Note that qQ > q∗ > qP and that the differences between these qualities
increase in the sensitivity to context, that is, in β.
Up-selling vs. down-selling. The previous two paragraphs show that up- and down-
selling attempts (from extreme attraction products to “mid-range” targets) are an integral
part of any fooling equilibrium. Whether firms engage in up- or down-selling depends on
the profitability of each regime. Condition (4) clearly shows that the asymmetric distortion
(θa, θt) = (P,Q) weakly dominates the symmetric distortions in virtual surplus and hence,
in profit.7 When firms have access to a technology that allows for product-specific choice of
θkj , constructing (θa, θt) = (P,Q) and down-selling the consumer is therefore always profit-
maximizing. With store-wide distortions, on the other hand, it depends on parameter values
whether the virtual surplus ν(θa,θt) is larger in the case of a quality-inflating context (θk = Q)
or a price-inflating context (θk = P ) and hence, whether firms use up- or down-selling
7Not shown in Expression 4 are other asymmetric distortions which are also dominated by (θa, θt) =
(P,Q). If (θa, θt) = (N,Q), the switching surplus is (β − 1)qt, while for (θa, θt) = (P,N), it is (β − 1)pa.
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strategies in equilibrium. In particular, because virtual surplus increases in the difference
between expected and realized purchase, the characteristics of the attraction product play an
important role for profitability: Up-selling entails a high switching surplus and is particularly
profitable if q is low. Similarly, down-selling is profitable if b is high. Accordingly, up-selling
attempts should be prevalent in markets where consumers have a limited budget (b low) and
can be attracted with a low-quality product (q low), while down-selling attempts are likely
to be found in markets where consumers expect a high minimum quality (q high) and do not
shy away from high prices (b high).
Zero-profit equilibrium and loss-leader products. Profits are zero in equilibrium even if
consumers are (infinitely) heterogeneous in their beliefs β˜ and the number of firms is limited
(to any number K ≥ 2). This is a result of the optimality condition uˆka = uˆ
k
t , which implies
that any consumer who strictly underestimates the effect of contextual distortions—i.e, holds
belief β˜ < β—(wrongly) expects to prefer product a over t at the store: If uˆa = uˆt, and
fooling is successful according to Lemma 2, then Eβ˜
%
uˆka
&
> Eβ˜
%
uˆkt
&
for any β˜ < β. Because
the best-response does not generate heterogenous expectations among consumers with β˜ < β,
consumers are treated as if they were perfectly homogeneous and competition is Bertrand-
like despite the extra fooling profits. In equilibrium, the context-dependent mark-ups on the
target are offset by negative mark-ups on the attraction product, pa < c(qa). In other words,
the attraction product is a “loss leader”.
Incentives to fool. With no “fooling profits” left in equilibrium, one might be tempted to
think that the incentives to fool are small. To show that this is not the case, we make these
incentives explicit. A simple transformation of Expression (4) yields a general expression for
the maximum profits of a firm that attracts consumers who have an outside option u¯ ≥ 0:
πt = qt − c(qt)− u¯' () *
max. profits without fooling
+(β − 1)
!""""#
""""$
(qt − qa) if (θa, θt) = (Q,Q),
(pa − pt) if (θa, θt) = (P, P ),
(qt + pa) if (θa, θt) = (P,Q).' () *
context-dependent fooling profits
(5)
Clearly, the higher the degree of context-sensitivity β, the higher are the incentives to fool
and deviate from the rational benchmark.8
Welfare. There are two aspects of the equilibrium that seem important for a welfare
analysis. The first aspect is the apparent difference in products purchased by rational and
8Note that Expression (5) also nests information on profits in less competitive market situations. The
maximum surplus available outside of the firm (u¯ ≥ 0) can be used to parameterize the degree of competition
in the market. For example, setting u¯ = 0 yields the monopoly profits and shows that for a monopolist,
higher context-sensitivity directly translates into higher profits.
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fooled consumers. If—for instance—welfare is defined by undistorted surplus generated by
trade occurring in equilibrium, the exploitation of context sensitivity leads to an efficiency
loss (relative to the rational benchmark) that increases in the context sensitivity parameter
β. Second, introspection suggests that the practice of fooling itself—i.e., the deliberate
generation of false expectations—may affect “experienced utility” and thus welfare of the
consumer.9 Taking this point of view, it is the “degree” of fooling that may be important
for the policy maker. The degree of fooling may be defined, for example, as the difference
between the expected and received (undistorted) surplus ua − ut. By Expression (4), the
degree of fooling is then nothing else than the context-dependent virtual surplus experienced
when switching products at the store. In equilibrium:
ua − ut =
!"""""""#
"""""""$
0 if consumers are rational or sophisticated,
(β − 1)(qQ − q) if consumers are fooled and (θa, θt) = (Q,Q),
(β − 1)[b− c(qQ)] if consumers are fooled and (θa, θt) = (P, P ),
(β − 1)(qQ + b) if consumers are fooled and (θa, θt) = (P,Q).
Following this definition, the degree of fooling increases in β as well as in the possibility
of firms to attract consumers with ‘extreme’ products having very low quality q or very high
price b. Note also that the degree of na¨ıvete´, expressible by the difference between actual
and expected context sensitivity β − β˜, does not affect outcomes and thus, leaves welfare
completely unaffected. This is due to all optimists, regardless of their degree of na¨ıvete´,
having identical (yet false) expectations about their purchase in equilibrium.
IV.B. Salience, Focusing, and Relative Thinking
We now introduce three specific models of contextual distortion to our framework that have
recently been suggested in the literature. These models make context a function of the
product-line—assuming that consumers overweight attributes to which relative comparisons
between products draw their attention.
Salience. Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013, BGS) assume that consumers attach
disproportionally high weight to salient attributes, where “[a]n attribute is salient for a good
when it stands out among the good’s attribute relative to that attribute’s average level in
the choice set” (BGS, abstract, p. 803). We apply the original salience definition by BGS
9We follow Chetty (2015, p.2) by acknowledging that “Behavioral biases [...] often generate differences
between welfare from a policy maker’s perspective, which depends on an agent’s experienced utility (his actual
well-being), and the agent’s decision utility (the objective the agent maximizes when making choices).” We
see our formal model as only representing “decision utility”, making an additional definition of “experienced
utility” for welfare analysis necessary and valid.
19
(BGS, Definition 1 and Assumption 1) to a choice set equal to the product line of store k:
Assumption S (Salience) Let zkR be the average level of attribute z ∈ {q, p} at store k.
The salience of attribute zj, z ∈ {s, p} at store k is given by a symmetric and continuous
(real-valued) function σ
+
zj, z
k
R
,
that satisfies ordering and homogeneity of degree zero.10
Then
θkj =
!""""#
""""$
Q iff σ
+
qj, q
k
R
,
> σ
+
pj, p
k
R
,
P iff σ
+
qj, q
k
R
,
< σ
+
pj, p
k
R
,
N otherwise.
The properties of the salience function listed in Assumption S are in analogy to key
features of sensory perception. Ordering says that salience increases in contrast: the higher
the difference to the reference, the more salient is an attribute. Homogeneity of degree zero
captures the concept of diminishing sensitivity, implying that relative differences instead of
absolute differences matter in comparisons. For zj > 0 and z
k
R > 0, σ(zj, z
k
R) =
|zj−z
k
R
|
(zj+zkR)
is an
example of a salience function that satisfies these properties.
Focusing. Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013, KS) argue “that a person focuses more on, and
hence overweights, attributes in which her options differ more” (KS, abstract, p. 53). We
implement the central assumption of KS (Assumption 1) in the following way:
Assumption F (Focusing) Let ∆kz be the spread of attribute z ∈ {q, p} at store k,
∆kz := maxj∈Jk zj −minj∈Jk zj, and let κF ≥ 0 be some (exogenously defined) threshold. Then
θkj =
!""""#
""""$
Q iff ∆kq −∆
k
p > κF
P iff ∆kp −∆
k
q > κF
N otherwise.
Note that for any two products {j, i} ∈ Jk, θkj = θ
k
i = θ
k.
Assumption F says that a consumer focuses more on, and hence overweights, quality (price)
iff the spread in qualities (prices) at store k is larger than the spread in prices (qualities)
by some threshold κF ≥ 0. This is a straightforward adaption of the central assumption
of KS to our rank-dependent framework where “focus-weights” can only take values of 1 or
10These are defined as follows. (1) Ordering: Let µ = sgn
-
zk − z
k
R
.
. Then, for any ε, ε′ ≥ 0 with ε+ε′ > 0,
σ
-
zj + µε, z
k
R − µε
′
.
> σ
-
zj , z
k
R
.
. (2) Homogeneity of degree zero: σ
-
αzj ,αz
k
R
.
= σ
-
zj , z
k
R
.
∀α > 0. These
definitions are valid for zj > 0 and z
k
R > 0. In order to work with nonpositive arguments, we would need to
formulate additional properties, see BGS. For our results it is however sufficient to have salience defined in
the positive domain.
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β ≥ 1. The exogeneous threshold κF ≥ 0 measures the level of stimulus necessary for such
a preference distortion.
Relative Thinking. Bushong, Rabin and Schwartzstein (2016, BRS) model the idea that
“[f]ixed differences loom smaller when compared to large differences” (BRS, abstract, p.1).
The consumer thus “weighs a given change along a consumption dimension by less when it
is compared to bigger changes along that dimension” (ibid.). We base our implementation
on the central norming assumptions N0-N2 in BRS.
Assumption RT (Relative Thinking) Let ∆kz be the spread of attribute z ∈ {q, p} at
store k, ∆kz := maxj∈Jk zj − minj∈Jk zj, and let κRT ≥ β be some (exogenously defined)
threshold. Then
θkj =
!"""""""""#
"""""""""$
Q iff
∆kp
∆kq
> κRT
P iff
∆kq
∆kp
> κRT
N otherwise.
Note that for any two products {j, i} ∈ Jk, θkj = θ
k
i = θ
k.
Assumption RT says that fixed differences loom smaller when compared to large attribute-
spreads ∆kz at the store. When the ratio
∆kp
∆kq
is sufficiently large, any given price-difference
looms (relatively) small compared to the overall price-spread while any given quality-
difference looms (relatively) large compared to the overall quality-spread, leading the con-
sumer to disproportionally concentrate on quality in pairwise comparisons of products. The
right-hand-side of the condition (κRT ≥ β) is due to norming assumption N2 in BRS which
“assures that people show some sensitivity to absolute consumption utility differences” (BRS,
p.8). A higher threshold κRT implies stronger contextual stimuli are required to distort pref-
erences from the baseline.11
11Assumption RT implements norming assumptions N0-N2 in the following way. Let w(·) denote the
weight function that attaches weight wkz ∈ {1,β} to attribute z ∈ {q, p}. N0 is simply the assumption that
w(·) is a function of the attribute spread ∆kz . Now suppose that quality has a higher weight than price, i.e.
wkq = β and w
k
p = 1. According to our framework, θ
k
j = Q for all products j ∈ J
k. By N1,
w(∆kq ) > w(∆
k
p)⇒ ∆
k
q < ∆
k
p.
But N2 makes a more restrictive assumption, namely,
w(∆kq ) > w(∆
k
p) ∧∆
k
q < ∆
k
p ⇒ w(∆
k
q )∆
k
s < w(∆
k
p)∆
k
p ⇔ β∆
k
q < ∆
k
p,
which is identical to our implementation by Assumption RT if κRT = β. The possibility of κRT > β captures
cases where stronger stimulus is required. An analogous statement establishes the case of θkj = P .
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Before we formulate the equilibrium when Θk is defined according to one of the theories
introduced above, note that the Salience specification (Assumption S) is the only specification
that allows distortions to be product-specific. Under Assumptions F and RT, contextual
distortions affect all products equally and are therefore always store-wide. Furthermore, the
set-up of all three theories implies that consumer preferences between any two products can
be manipulated by a third product that is added to the choice-set. When context is defined
according to one of the three theories, we can therefore make the following observation.
Proposition 3 (Fooling with Decoys: Salience, Focusing, and Relative Thinking)
Assume that consumers are context-sensitive (β > 1), and underestimate their sensitivity
to context (β˜ < β for all consumers). Under Assumption S, F, or RT, a competitive
equilibrium exists. In any such equilibrium, at least 2 firms share the market, each firm
offering 3 products, t, a ∕= t, and d /∈ {t, a}. The firm sells product t, but attracts with
product a. The sole function of product d is to manipulate preferences: Product d is a decoy.
Moreover,
a) Under Assumption F or RT, a firm with strictly positive demand chooses (θa, θt), (qt, pt),
and (qa, pa) according to Proposition 2, Part a).
b) Under Assumption S, a firm with strictly positive demand chooses (θa, θt), (qt, pt), and
(qa, pa) according to Proposition 2, Part b).
The important take-away from Proposition 3 is that with each of the three specifications
the product-line itself becomes a technology that enables firms to distort consumer prefer-
ences after entering the store. In particular, any profit-maximizing distortion of attraction
product and target can be realized by adding just one additional product to the product-
line. The function of this decoy is to manipulate the “reference points” of consumers, making
the target look disproportionally attractive compared to the attraction product at the store.
This technology enables firms to virtually choose θkj and fool according to Proposition 2. All
three specifications predict a single decoy in equilibrium. To achieve incentive compatibility,
the decoy must necessarily be an unattractive option (neither preferred outside nor inside
the store). The location of this product in quality-price-space however depends on which
specification is employed.
Decoy-Positions: Focusing and Relative Thinking. Figure 1 shows decoy-positions under
Assumptions F and RT in equilibrium. Under these assumptions, firms are restricted to store-
wide distortions. There are two cases: (1) the firm up-sells, qt > qa, by inflating perceived
qualities: (θa, θt) = (Q,Q) (left figure), or (2) the firm down-sells, qt < qa, by inflating
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perceived prices: (θa, θt) = (P, P ) (right figure). To achieve the profit-maximizing distortion
without violating incentive compatibility, the firm has to add a decoy to the product-line
that resides within the boundaries of the grey shaded areas in Figure 1.12 A product located
in this area is “unattractive” itself but manipulates the attribute spreads ∆q and ∆p—which
constitute reference points of consumer attention according to the theories of Focusing and
Relative Thinking—in favor of the target. Note that the shaded areas for Assumption F
and RT do not overlap, implying that decoys can help identifying the two models from data:
According to the theory of Focusing (KS), a consumer overweights the attribute in which
her options differ more. A successful decoy therefore serves to extend the spread of that
attribute on which the target is better than the attraction product (quality when up-selling,
price when downselling). The theory of Relative Thinking (BRS), on the other hand, makes a
somewhat opposite assumption, namely that a fixed difference looms smaller when compared
to a large spread. A successful decoy therefore has to extend the spread of that attribute on
which the target is worse than the attraction product (price when up-selling, quality when
down-selling). Under both theories, a choice that resonates with experimental literature and
anecdotal evidence on so-called decoy effects is to construct a decoy that copies the target
in one attribute, but is strictly worse along the other dimension.13 The white markers in
Figure I illustrate such a choice.
Decoy-Positions: Salience. When attention is modeled according to BGS’ model of
Salience (Assumption S), contextual distortions of quality and price may be product-specific
and choosing distortion (θa, θt) = (P,Q) is profit-maximizing. Figure II illustrates how
the firm can construct this distortion by manipulating the position of the reference point
(qR, pR) using a single decoy.
14 The figure depicts the case when, as in equilibrium, qa > qt
and pa > pt. The construction (which we also use to prove Proposition 3) exploits two
central implications of the Salience framework: (1) If product j ∈ Jk neither dominates nor
is dominated by the reference point, i.e.,
+
qj − q
k
R
, +
pj − p
k
R
,
> 0, then the “advantageous”
attribute of product j—higher quality or lower price relative to the average—is overweighted
12The shaded areas show decoy positions for minimum thresholds κF = 0 and κRT = β. Larger thresholds
demand decoys that are located further away from products t and a.
13See, e.g., Huber, Payne and Puto (1982); Doyle et al. (1999); Herne (1999) for experimental literature
on asymmetrically dominated decoys. It is interesting to see that optimal firm behavior produces entire
product-lines that very strongly resemble experimental tests as well as anecdotal evidence on decoy effects.
While the characteristics of the decoy (for a given set of competitor and target) derive from the particular
specification of consumer attention, it is our model that explains (and predicts) the existence of all three
products—decoy, competitor and target—at one firm. We are not aware of another theory with a similar
prediction.
14Recall that the reference point according to the theory of Salience is a “fictitious” product with quality
qR and price pR conforming to the average quality and price, respectively, in the choice-set.
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Quality q
Price p
Up-Selling Equilibrium, (?a ,?t)=(Q,Q)
qd<qt , pd =pt
 Assumption F
?q - ?p > 0
qd =qt , pd >pt
Assumption RT
?p/?q > ?
Attraction Product
 Target
Price p
Quality q
 Assumption F
?p - ?q > 0
 Target
Assumption RT
?q/?p > ?
Attraction Product
qd<qt , pd= pt
qd =qt , p d >p t
Down-Selling Equilibrium, (?a ,?t)=(P,P)
Figure I
Decoy positions (shaded areas) under Assumption F or Assumption RT
if and only if the product has better-than-average quality-to-price ratio, that is, qj
pj
>
qk
R
pk
R
.15
(2) If one attribute of product j ∈ Jk is average while the other is not (e.g., qj = q
k
R, but
pj ∕= p
k
R), then the latter is “outstanding” and thus salient. Following these rules, the firm
can implement the distortion (θa, θt) = (P,Q) by constructing a reference point (q
k
R, p
k
R) that
is either clearly dominated by the target (pR = pt, but qR < qt) or by the attraction product
(qR = qa, but pR > pt). Which of the two constructions is feasible depends on whether
the target or the attraction product has a higher quality-to-price ratio (see the left-hand-
side and right-hand-side of Figure II, respectively). In both cases, such a reference point
can always be constructed—using a single, unattractive decoy—without violating incentive
compatibility (as exemplarily shown in Figure II).
IV.C. Mixed Populations
Our propositions have so far stated results for the polar cases of either an entirely sophis-
ticated/pessimistic consumer population (Proposition 1, inducing the rational outcome) or
an entirely optimistic consumer population (Propositions in this section, inducing a fool-
ing outcome). The next proposition shows that equilibrium outcomes for both optimistic
(β˜ < β) and non-optimistic (β˜ ≥ β) consumers—as well as market supply for each group—
15Also, iff
qj
pj
<
qkR
pk
R
, then the “disadvantageous” attribute of product j is overweighted, while iff
qj
pj
=
qkR
pk
R
,
consumers weigh both attributes equally.
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Quality q
Price p
Attraction Product
(Price-Inflated)
Target
(Quality-Inflated)
Reference Product
qR < qt, pR = pt
qR /pR > qa /pa
Construction of (?a ,?t)=(P,Q) if qt /pt > qa /pa
Decoy
Quality q
Price p
Attraction Product
(Price-Inflated)
Target
(Quality-Inflated)
Reference Product
qR = qa, pR > pa
qR /pR < qt /pt
Construction of (?a ,?t)=(P,Q) if qt /pt < qa /pa
Decoy
Target
Av rage Quality/Price 
q⁻ k  , ⁻ k > pa
q⁻ k/p⁻k < qt /pt
Figure II
Construction of distortion (θa, θt) = (P,Q) (with one decoy) under Assumption S
are unchanged when the consumer population is mixed, i.e., when these groups co-exist in
society.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium with Fooling and Non-Fooling Firms) Assume that
consumers are context sensitive (β > 1) and firms either directly choose θkj (with store-wide
or product-specific distortions, following the assumptions in Proposition 2), or Assumption
S, F, or RT is satisfied (firms can manipulate θkj indirectly using decoy products). A
competitive equilibrium exists. Moreover,
a) If there exist consumers who are sophisticated or overestimate their sensitivity to context
(β˜ ≥ β), then there exist at least 2 non-fooling (‘truthful’) firms that each offer 1 product
with quality q∗ at marginal cost c(q∗) and all consumers with β˜ ≥ β buy at one of these
firms.
b) If there exist consumers who underestimate their sensitivity to context (β˜ < β), then there
exist at least 2 fooling firms that each offer 2 or 3 products, according to Propositions 2
and 3, respectively, and all consumers with β˜ < β buy at one of these firms.
c) Firms that do not supply the market (according to cases a or b), choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅.
Intuition for this result follows from the fact that sophisticated and pessimistic consumers
necessarily “see through” any fooling schemes that firms design to exploit optimistic con-
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sumers (see also Lemma 2). Knowing that they would buy the inefficient target when enter-
ing such a store, these consumers can be attracted by ‘truthful’ firms that offer commitment
devices in the form of single-product stores (where fooling attempts are impossible). In equi-
librium, competition leads these truthful firms to sell cost-efficient quality q∗ at marginal
cost c∗. Optimistic consumers, on the other hand, can be profitably fooled even if their
outside option is to buy q∗ at price c∗. Competition for this group of consumers leads to the
equilibrium product-lines defined in Proposition 2 (and confirmed under Assumption S, F,
or RT in Proposition 3).
V. Discussion and Conclusion
We have presented a theory of firms that use contextual variations in the presentation of
options to enable a deceptive marketing strategy able to exploit the na¨ıvite´ of consumers. In
this final section, we first turn to the question of how to confront our theory with anecdotal
and empirical evidence and then shortly discuss welfare implications and possible regulatory
interventions. We concentrate throughout on our predictions regarding market supply for
consumers who underestimate their sensitivity to context, as this is where market supply
deviates from the predictions of the rational benchmark.16
Store-context as a marketing strategy. We predict that firms design context to drive a
wedge between preferences before and after entering a store in order to compete with a
product that is different to the product that they ultimately aim to sell. Anecdotal evidence
in the form of consumer and marketing blogs is ample for such up- and down-selling attempts
to be wide-spread in actual retail markets. With regard to up-selling, we present just one of
many possible examples in Figure III. The figure shows an online advertisement as well as
the product-line of the Dollar Shave Club, an online retailer of razors.17 In this example, the
firm attracts consumers with “great razors” priced at $1, but once consumers have entered
the online-store, tries up-selling from this budget option (now unattractively called “the
humble twin”) to a more expensive razor. Note that the example matches the description
of a product-line that uses an attraction product (‘The Humble Twin”), a target (“The
4X”–“Member favorite”) and a decoy (“The Executive”). Other popular examples include
up-selling attempts in airline ticket and rental car markets—where firms typically attract
consumers with low priced-products via price-comparison websites but then try up-selling to
more expensive options after the consumer has entered the website of a particular firm—or
16As we have shown in the main part of the paper, predictions for context-sensitive consumers who do
not underestimate their bias is identical to a standard model without context-sensitivity.
17We have borrowed this example from the website https://econsultancy.com/blog/66879-10-powerful-
examples-of-upselling-online/ (accessed 09-20-2016), which presents many more.
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the famous The Economist example by Dan Ariely (Ariely, 2008).
 
a) b) 
Figure III
Example for an (alleged) up-selling strategy on the internet: a) Advertised Product of the
Dollar Shave Club, b) Product-Line at the web store of the Dollar Shave Club
Source: a) http://www.razorpedia.com/blog/dollar-shave-club-business-update, b) https://
econsultancy.com/blog/66879-10-powerful-examples-of-upselling-online/, both websites ac-
cessed on 09-20-2016.
With regard to down-selling, similar examples can be found. For instance, CBS reporter
Jeremy Quittner writes on “How to Boost Sales by Down-Selling Your Customers” and gives
an illustrative example from the fashion industry: “Take handbag company Oovoo Designs in
Alexandria, Va. In 2008, Pauline Lewis, founder of the $500,000 company, saw sales slipping
about 15 percent for her high-end bags [...]. So Lewis took immediate action. [...] From her
research she came away with a new idea: a line of $35 cell-phone holders with some of the
same hand-embroidered flourishes as the pricier items. [...] ‘Younger women can’t afford the
$250 bag, but they love the brand so much [...],’ she adds. The strategy ultimately offset
losses for the more up-market bags. She sold about 1,500 of the cell-phone holders in 2008,
and then about 2,500 the following year.”18 Note that in this example, the attraction product
18http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-to-boost-sales-by-down-selling-your-customers/, accessed 09-20-
2016.
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is some high-end handbag (that is ultimately not sold) while actual profits are made on a
cheaper, lower-quality item, the cell-phone holder.
Up-selling vs down-selling. Our model predicts that firms can use both up- and down-
selling regimes to exploit context-sensitive consumers. To the best of our knowledge, our
theory is the first to explain both up-selling and down-selling attempts of firms within one
framework. Which of the two strategies is actually chosen by a firm depends on its technolog-
ical ability to distort context as well as on market characteristics: We predict up-selling to be
more likely in “no-frills ”markets where consumers can be attracted with low-quality prod-
ucts at low prices—like in the razor-example above—and down-selling to be more likely in
“up-scale” markets where consumers can be attracted by luxurious products at high prices—
conforming to the handbag-example above. While it is easier to find specific examples and
blogs covering up-selling attempts, marketing methods in up-scale markets seem to have
much in common with a down-selling strategy. This is true for the fashion industry but also
for car brands like Mercedes or BMW. These firms advertise quality, not price, when show-
ing expensive sports cars and putting up slogans like “sheer driving pleasure” or “driving
DNA” to attract consumers, while making the bulk of their final sales on cheaper cars of
considerably less sportiness.
Loss leaders as attraction products. Our model predicts that in sufficiently competitive
markets the product with which consumers are attracted to the store is a loss-leader. Cheva-
lier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003) provide empirical support for existing loss-leading models like
Lal and Matutes (1994) and Hosken, Matsa and Reiffen (2000). Using price and sales data
on a large grocery store in Chicago, they find that it is the advertised product varieties
that are discounted in times of high (idiosyncratic) demand. This finding is consistent with
our theory. However, it does not separate it from existing models that treat loss leading
in isolation from up- or down-sell strategies and that assume, other than we do, that loss
leaders are meant as much for sale as other products. Some evidence for this missing piece is
provided by Ellison and Ellison (2009). Using data on online markets for computer memory,
the authors find that firms attract consumer with a loss-leader product via the price-search
engine Pricewatch. Once attracted, consumers are manipulated into purchasing a product
with a higher profit-margin. Hence, Ellison and Ellison (2009) provide evidence for the use
of loss-leaders in combination with an up-selling strategy.
Context Effects. The evidence and examples presented by Ellison and Ellison (2009) are
very much in line with the predictions of our theory. Still, there is as yet no systematic evi-
dence that it is the context at the final point of purchase that induces consumers to switch
products. An extensive experimental literature documents effects of exogenous context on
consumer choice that are consistent with our theory and match the design of choice environ-
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ments in many examples of up- and down-selling attempts. This pertains both to studies
of “atmospheric effects” (context created by such things as the color scheme, lighting, and
flooring of a store, see Turley and Milliman, 2000, for a review) and choice-set related decoy-
effects (see, e.g., Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982; Simonson, 1989; Simonson and Tversky,
1992; Herne, 1999; Doyle et al., 1999). The latter evidence is particularly in line with our
model when nesting the frameworks suggested by BGS, KS, and BRS, which predict that
firms use decoys similar to the experimental evidence to manipulate preferences at the store.
We are however not aware of clean evidence on consumer sensitivity to or firms’ strategic
choice of store-context in competitive markets. This gap in the empirical literature opens
up to a promising new avenue for future research.
We end with a note on welfare and policy. Welfare statements—and for this reason,
policy recommendations—are inherently difficult in situations where consumers make time-
inconsistent choices. To borrow two terms recently suggested by Chetty (2015), making
conclusive statements about welfare in the presence of such biases requires the modeler to
define what is the “experienced utility” of the consumer (his actual well-being) and how this
utility compares to his “decision utility” (the objective the agent maximizes when making
choices). The question of how experienced utility should be exactly defined is ultimately
an empirical one. Irrespective of the finer functional details of such a definition we believe
that there are two aspects that seem important for a welfare analysis of the equilibrium we
have described. First, the possibility of firms to manipulate preferences by manipulating
the environment of a choice leads competitive firms to sell products that may not be cost-
efficient from a welfare perspective. Because firms in equilibrium use both, up- and down-
selling strategies, and therefore may sell products that have quality both higher or lower
against any stable benchmark, such efficiency losses are likely to occur for any definition
of experienced utility that is non-identical with decision-utility at the moment of purchase.
Second, introspection suggests that the systematic practice of up- and down-selling itself
may affect experienced utility and thus welfare of the consumer because it builds on the
deliberate generation of false expectations. Taking this point of view, it is the “degree” of
fooling—i.e., the difference between expected and received utility—that is important for the
policy maker. Notably in this case, welfare does not only depend on the characteristics of the
product purchased, but also on the characteristics of the product with which the consumer is
attracted to the store. In particular, attraction products that are more “extreme” in terms of
quality and price (for example, advertisements with “ultra-low-budget” or “top-of-the-range”
products) are likely to entail more extreme up- and down-selling attempts and produce larger
welfare effects.
Above reasoning suggests that policy makers might want to curb the power of firms to use
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store-context as a marketing tool. In fact, the equilibrium practice of up- and down-selling
we have described in this paper resembles the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) definition
of a Bait-and-Switch: “Bait advertising is an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or
service which the advertiser in truth does not intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch
consumers from buying the advertised merchandise, in order to sell something else, usually
at a higher price or on a basis more advantageous to the advertiser” (16 C.F.R. §238.0).
The conventional way the FTC deals with bait-and-switch schemes is to require that any
offers a firm makes in order to attract consumers are bona fide, enforced in practice by not
allowing firms to prevent the consumer from buying the product if they will, for example,
by “refusal to show, demonstrate, or sell the product offered in accordance with the terms
of the offer”, “failure to have available at all outlets listed in the advertisement a sufficient
quantity of the advertised product”, or “use of a sales plan or method of compensation for
salesmen or penalizing salesmen, designed to prevent or discourage them from selling the
advertised product” (16 C.F.R. §238.3). However, because store-context induces consumers
to switch products at their own will once they have entered the store, such conventional
policy does not have any bite in our set-up and is ineffective in helping the na¨ıve consumer
population. More than that, directly regulating store-context seems a futile attempt due
to the vast number of environmental variables that may affect preferences at the point of
purchase. A more promising approach is to curb the “context-related” power of retailers by
increasing the possibilities for consumers to purchase products without having to enter the
store of a particular firm. While this is difficult to achieve in bricks-and-mortar markets, it
is easy in online-markets. Policy makers could, for instance, require that firms advertising
on product comparison websites such as Google Shopping or PriceCrawler must allow con-
sumers to purchase offers directly on the comparison website. The viability of such a policy
is demonstrated by the fact that the option to purchase an airline ticket without leaving the
Google Flights search engine is already available in some cases.19 Besides the apparent low
cost of such a policy intervention, demanding that retailers make their products available
on competitive platforms has other desirable features: First, the regulation is effective inde-
pendently of the technology that is used to manipulate consumer preferences at the store.
In fact, it is effective in cases where there is a “rational” (i.e., search cost) explanation for
deceptive up-and down-selling stategies at the store level (see, e.g., Ellison and Wolitzky,
2012). In that sense, the proposed regulation is “model-neutral”. Second, the regulation
is “non-paternalistic” in that it helps na¨ıve consumers without altering market supply for
rational or sophisticated consumers. Third, the existence of an option to purchase prod-
ucts on a competitive platform without forbidding consumers to proceed to a firm-specific
19See https://support.google.com/flights/answer/6236307 (accessed 10-21-2016).
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store for purchase (such as realized on the Google Flights search engine) gives researchers
the possibility to study purchase decision in competitive as well as in-store situations and
thus enables a better understanding of the effect the current retail market structure has on
market outcomes.
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Appendix: Proofs to the Results in the Main Text
We use the following method throughout all proofs to find market supply in the competitive
equilibrium: First, we derive the best response of some firm k to a fixed competitor offer
(M−k,Θ−k) conditional on attracting a positive share of consumers under the assumption
that the maximum price b consumers are able to pay is arbitrarily large, i.e., b → ∞.
In general, this best response will be unique and continuous in (M−k,Θ−k). Due to this
characteristic, in a second step, we can find the competitive market supply by searching
for the competitor offer (M−k,Θ−k) that equates the profits of this response to zero. At
this point, firms that supply the market will sell a cost-efficient quality (q∗, qQ, or qP ) at
cost, making zero profit. When we drop the assumption b→∞, consumers will always buy
such a product if b ≥ c(qQ) > c(q∗) > c(qP ), which holds by section II.C. of this paper.
The (interior) solution we define using this method is thus valid without the assumption
b → ∞. Moreover, firms who do not supply the market must always choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅,
because this is the only response that avoids any costs and yields nonnegative profits. While
supplying the market at cost and choosing (Mk,Θk) = ∅ both yield zero profits and are thus
best responses, in equilibrium, at least 2 firms must choose to supply the market. Otherwise
there would exist some firm k that faced only competitors choosing (Mk,Θk) = ∅, making a
deviation to monopoly profits possible. In general, we therefore have a range of competitive
equilibria that all result in the same market supply: At least 2 firms share the market and
sell at cost, while all other firms choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅.
Proof of Lemma 1 (Rational Benchmark). Let β = 1. This implies that consumers
are homogeneous and have time-consistent surplus function uj = qj − pj. Context leaves
valuations unaffected, θkj = N for all j and k.
Consider some firm k and fix the competitor offer M−k. Let u¯ ≥ 0 be the maximum
surplus attainable outside of firm k (this surplus is implicitly defined by M−k and the
outside option of no purchase). Let b → ∞ and consider the best response conditional
on attracting a positive share of consumers. Fix some quality qj ≥ q. The firm can sell
qj to all consumers at price pj = limδ→0(qj − u¯ − δ) = qj − u¯. At this price, the firm
offers just enough surplus to let consumers marginally improve over the highest surplus
available elsewhere, thereby winning all consumers. For given quality qj, no other price
can achieve higher profits: A higher price implies the loss of all consumers, a lower price
cannot attract more. This price implies profit πk = qj − u¯ − c(qj) and thus, the profit-
maximizing quality to sell is q∗ := argmax[q − c(q)], or c′(q∗) = 1. Note that q∗ > q by
assumption, making this interior solution valid. Offering additional products is costly and
cannot increase profits. It follows: Conditional on attracting a positive share of consumers,
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the unique best response is the product-lineMk = ((q∗, q∗− u¯)). Note that the best response
so defined is unique and continuous in u¯. Market supply in the competitive equilibrium can
thus be found by searching for u¯ where this response yields zero profits. This unique point
exists at u¯ = q∗ − c(q∗), implying marginal cost pricing, pj = c(q
∗) and the product-line
M∗ = ((q∗, c(q∗)). This solution is valid by our model assumption b > c(q∗), such that we
can drop the assumption b→∞.
Given that some firm offers M∗ = ((q∗, c(q∗)), other firms face u¯ = q∗ − c(q∗). There are
two best responses: (1) Sell M∗ = ((q∗, c(q∗)) as well, which yields zero profits, (2) Offer
nothing, Mk = ∅, which is the only response avoiding all costs and also yields zero profits. In
any equilibrium, at least 2 firms must offer the product-line M∗: If no firm offered M∗, then
any firm would face an outside option u¯ = 0 < q∗ − c(q∗) and there would exist a deviation
incentive to monopoly profits. If only one firm offered M∗, then, similarly, this firm could
earn monopoly profits by deviating. We thus have a range of competitive equilibria that all
result in the same market supply: At least 2 firms share the market and offer M∗, while all
other firms choose Mk = ∅.
Proof of Lemma 2 (Fooling Regimes). Assume that the firm fools the consumer,
selling product t ∈ Jk, but attracting the consumer with another product a ∈ Jk, a ∕= t.
Then
uˆkt ≥ uˆ
k
a(by IC)
Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
≤ Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
(by PCC)
with at least one inequality strict: incentive compatibility (IC) requires that the consumer
weakly prefers the target at the store, the perceived choice constraint (PCC) requires that
the consumer expects to weakly prefer the attraction product at the store. To induce the
consumer to switch products, at least one inequality needs to be strict. Fix θa and θt. If
(θa, θa) = (N,N), Eβ˜0
%
uˆkj
&
= uˆkj = uj for j ∈ {a, b} and any β˜
0 such that both, IC and PCC
hold with equality, a contradiction. For at least one inequality to be strict, (θa, θa) ∕= (N,N):
if the consumer is fooled, store-context distorts the valuation of at least one of the products.
Also, if β˜0 = β, then Eβ˜0
%
uˆkj
&
= uˆkj for any distortion (θa, θt). Again, IC and PCC cannot
hold with one inequality being strict. Thus, if the consumer is fooled, she must be na¨ıve
regarding contextual distortions, that is, β˜0 ∕= β.
Assume for the rest of the proof that (θa, θt) ∕= (N,N) and β˜
0 ∕= β. Define the function
vj(γ) := uˆ
k
j |β=γ. Note that vj(1) = uj, vj(β) = uˆ
k
j and vj(β˜
0) = Eβ˜0
%
uˆkj
&
. We can rewrite
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the fooling constraints as
uˆkt ≥ uˆ
k
a ⇔ vt(β) ≥ va(β)(by IC)
Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
≤ Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
⇔ vt(β˜
0) ≤ va(β˜
0).(by PCC)
The two conditions imply that if the consumer is fooled, ∃γ0 ∈ [min{β˜0, β},max{β˜0, β}]
s.t. vt(γ
0) − va(γ
0) = 0 (a point where products a and t yield identical surplus). We first
want to show that this crossing is unique. For this, note that for a given distortion θj,
∂vj/∂γ = const. Thus, ∂[vt(γ)− va(γ)]/∂γ = const. Because at least one inequality is strict,
∂[vt(γ)− va(γ)]/∂γ ∕= 0. Thus, if a crossing exists, it must be unique. It follows:
a) If the consumer is pessimistic (β˜0 > β) and fooled, then ∃!γ0 ∈ [β, β˜0] s.t.
vt(γ
0)− va(γ
0) = 0. By IC, vt(β)− va(β) ≥ 0 and thus, vt(γ
0)− va(γ
0) < 0 ∀γ > γ0 and
vt(γ
0)− va(γ
0) > 0 ∀γ < γ0.
This implies that
• ∀β˜ > γ0, vt(β˜) − va(β˜) < 0 ⇔ Eβ˜
%
uˆkt
&
− Eβ˜
%
uˆka
&
< 0: all pessimistic agents with
β˜ > γ0 (falsely) expect to prefer product a over product t at the store and are
therefore also fooled by the pair (a, t). If γ0 = β, all pessimistic agents are fooled.
• ∀β˜ < β ≤ γ0, vt(β˜) − va(β˜) > 0 ⇔ Eβ˜
%
uˆkt
&
− Eβ˜
%
uˆka
&
> 0: all optimistic agents
(correctly) expect to prefer product t over product a at the store and are therefore
not fooled by the pair (a, t).
• vt(1) − va(1) > 0 ⇔ ut − ua > 0 by γ
0 > 1: the target yields higher undistorted
surplus than the attraction product.
b) If the consumer is optimistic (β˜0 < β) and fooled, then ∃!γ0 ∈ [β˜0, β] s.t.
vt(γ
0)− va(γ
0) = 0. By IC, vt(β)− va(β) ≥ 0, and thus, vt(γ
0)− va(γ
0) > 0 ∀γ > γ0 and
vt(γ
0)− va(γ
0) < 0 ∀γ < γ0.
This implies that
• ∀β˜ < γ0, vt(β˜) − va(β˜) < 0 ⇔ Eβ˜
%
uˆkt
&
− Eβ˜
%
uˆka
&
< 0: all optimistic agents with
β˜ < γ0 (falsely) expect to prefer product a over t at the store and are therefore also
fooled by the pair (a, t). If γ0 = β, all optimistic agents are fooled.
• ∀β˜ > β ≥ γ0, vt(β˜) − va(β˜) > 0 ⇔ Eβ˜
%
uˆkt
&
− Eβ˜
%
uˆka
&
> 0: all pessimistic agents
(correctly) expect to prefer product t over product a at the store and are therefore
not fooled by the pair (a, t).
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• vt(1) − va(1) < 0 ⇔ ut − ua < 0 by γ
0 > 1: the target yields lower undistorted
surplus than the attraction product.
Proof of Lemma 3 (Profitable Fooling). Fix (M−k,Θ−k). (M−k,Θ−k) implies an
outside option with surplus u¯(β˜0) ≥ 0 for a consumer of type β˜0. Assume q → 0 and b→∞.
Fix any target quality qt = q
0
t ≥ 0. If the firm does not fool, the consumer correctly expects
to purchase the target when entering firm k. Thus, conditional on not fooling, the maximum
selling price for quality q0t is
p0t := q
0
t − u¯(β˜
0).
For example, the firm could only offer product t (and no other product). Then consumers
of type β˜0 enter the store of firm k if ut ≥ u¯(β˜
0). Given quality qt = q
0
t and price p
0
t , this
condition holds with equality. Formally, the firm can achieve that type β˜0 enter the store
with certainty by choosing pt = limδ→0[q
0
t − u¯(β˜
0)− δ] = p0t .
Part a) (If type β˜0 is pessimistic (β˜0 > β), fooling her is unprofitable). Assume
that firm k fools type β˜0. We will first show that fooling a pessimistic type (β˜0 > β) is
unprofitable. For this, we will derive an upper bound on the price for a given target quality
q0t , p¯t(q
0
t ) (conditional on fooling the consumer and selling her target t ∕= a), and show that
this bound is lower than the price p0t .
Consider stage 2, i.e., the decision of the consumer of what product j ∈ Jk to purchase
after she has entered the store of firm k. A lower bound on the (context-dependent) surplus
of the target is given by uˆkt = uˆ
k
a: Lowering uˆ
k
t by charging a higher price pt or offering a lower
quality qt will make the consumer choose product a over t, violating incentive compatibility.
Rewriting uˆkt = uˆ
k
a as (uˆ
k
t − ut) + ut = (uˆ
k
a − ua) + ua ⇔ (uˆ
k
t − ut) + qt − pt = (uˆ
k
a − ua) + ua
and solving this expression for pt and qt, respectively, yields as an upper bound on price:
pt = qt − ua + (ua − ut),(6)
Now consider stage 1. Condition uˆkt = uˆ
k
a implies that if the consumer is fooled,
Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
< Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
: the consumer expects to strictly prefer product a over t at store k.
She enters the store iff the expected purchase—i.e., product a—yields undistorted surplus
that is as least as high as her outside option, i.e., ua ≥ u¯(β˜
0). Consider the bound on pt
as defined in Equations (6): Clearly, this bound is maximized if the participation constraint
ua ≥ u¯(β˜
0) binds, i.e., if ua = u¯(β˜
0). We conclude: conditional on fooling and selling target
t ∕= a to a consumer of type β˜0, an upper bound on the price for given target quality q0t is
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given by
p¯t(qt) := qt − u¯(β˜
0) + (ua − ut).
It is now easy to see that fooling pessimistic types is not profitable. By Lemma 2, if a
pessimistic type is fooled, ua < ut: It follows from p¯t(qt) and qt(pt) that if the firm sells
t ∕= a, then it must charge a lower price pt < p
0
t for quality q
0
t . This concludes the proof for
part a).
Part b) (If type β˜0 is optimistic (β˜0 < β), fooling her is profitable). Turn-
ing to the case of an optimistic type, note first that if β˜0 < β, then by Lemma 2,
(ut − ua) < 0⇔ (ua − ut) > 0 and thus, p¯t(q
0
t ) > p
0
t . This suggests that fooling a pessimistic
type may be profitable. We will now show that this is indeed the case iff store-context dis-
torts the surplus of products a and t as described in the lemma. Given a distortion (θa, θt),
we can rewrite IC and PCC as conditions on the attributes of products a and t:
• Assume that (θa, θt) = (Q,Q). If β˜
0 < β, the following two statements are equivalent:
1. If the consumer is fooled,
uˆkt ≥ uˆ
k
a ⇔ β(qt − qa) ≥ pt − pa(by IC)
Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
≤ Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
⇔ β˜0(qt − qa) ≤ pt − pa,(by PCC)
with at least one inequality strict.
2. If the consumer is fooled, qt > qa and pt > pa (the firm up-sells).
• Assume that (θa, θt) = (P, P ). If β˜
0 < β, the following two statements are equivalent:
1. If the consumer is fooled,
uˆkt ≥ uˆ
k
a ⇔ β(pa − pt) ≥ qa − qt(by IC)
Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
≤ Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
⇔ β˜0(pa − pt) ≤ qa − qt,(by PCC)
with at least one inequality strict.
2. If the consumer is fooled, qt < qa and pt < pa (the firm down-sells).
• Assume that (θa, θt) = (P,Q). If β˜
0 < β, the following two statements are equivalent:
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1. If the consumer is fooled,
uˆkt ≥ uˆ
k
a ⇔ β(qt + pa) ≥ qa + pt(by IC)
Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
≤ Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
⇔ β˜0(qt + pa) ≤ qa + pt,(by PCC)
with at least one inequality strict.
2. If the consumer is fooled, qt + pa > 0 and qa + pt > 0.
• Assume that (θa, θt) = (P,N). If β˜
0 < β, the following two statements are equivalent:
1. If the consumer is fooled,
uˆkt ≥ uˆ
k
a ⇔ βpa ≥ qa − qt + pt(by IC)
Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
≤ Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
⇔ β˜0pa ≤ qa − qt + pt,(by PCC)
with at least one inequality strict.
2. If the consumer is fooled, pa > 0 and qa − qt + pt > 0.
• Assume that (θa, θt) = (Q,P ). If β˜
0 < β, the following two statements are equivalent:
1. If the consumer is fooled,
uˆkt ≥ uˆ
k
a ⇔ β(qa + pt) ≤ qt + pa(by IC)
Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
≤ Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
⇔ β˜0(qa + pt) ≥ qt + pa,(by PCC)
with at least one inequality strict.
2. If the consumer is fooled, qa + pt < 0 and qt + pa < 0.
• Assume that (θa, θt) = (Q,N). If β˜
0 < β, the following two statements are equivalent:
1. If the consumer is fooled,
uˆkt ≥ uˆ
k
a ⇔ βqa ≤ qt − pt + pa(by IC)
Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
≤ Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
⇔ β˜0qa ≥ qt − pt + pa,(by PCC)
with at least one inequality strict.
2. If the consumer is fooled, qa < 0 and qt − pt + pa < 0.
• Assume that (θa, θt) = (N,P ). If β˜
0 < β, the following two statements are equivalent:
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1. If the consumer is fooled,
uˆkt ≥ uˆ
k
a ⇔ βpt ≤ qt − qa + pa(by IC)
Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
≤ Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
⇔ β˜0pt ≥ qt − qa + pa,(by PCC)
with at least one inequality strict.
2. If the consumer is fooled, pt < 0 and qt − qa + pa < 0.
It is obvious from the conditions derived above that any distortion (θa, θt) ∈
{(Q,P ), (Q,N), (N,P )} cannot lead to a profitable fooling outcome. In particular, fool-
ing with any one of these distortions requires that either, qa < 0, or pt < 0, or both. But if
qa < 0, the attraction product has below minimum quality q and can therefore not attract
consumers to the store, while if pt < 0, the firm would sell the target strictly below marginal
cost and make negative profit. We conclude: If store-context asymmetrically distorts context
in favor of the attraction product, (θa, θt) ∈ {(Q,P ), (Q,N), (N,P )}, the consumer cannot
be fooled to purchase target t at any pt ≥ 0.
It remains to be shown that fooling is profitable if (θa, θt) ∈
{(Q,Q), (P, P ), (P,Q), (P,N), (Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
N,Q)}. In particular, we will show that with
any one of these distortions, the firm can indeed sell quality q0t at price p¯t(q
0
t ) ≥ p
0
t .
W.l.o.g, we assume for the rest of the proof that either a and t are the only products
that firm k offers, or that other existing products do not violate IC and PCC, that is,
∀j ∈ Jk, j /∈ {a, t}, uˆkj < uˆ
k
t and Eβ˜0
%
uˆkj
&
< Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
. Fix some q0t > 0 and pt = p¯t(q
0
t ).
Recall that the construction of p¯t(q
0
t ) implies that IC is satisfied with equality, i.e, uˆ
k
t = uˆ
k
a.
Formally, the firm chooses qj and pj from the discretized set of real numbers R¯(δ) where
δ → 0 and achieves that the consumer purchases the target with certainty by choosing uˆkt
arbitrarily close but above uˆka, i.e., uˆ
k
t = limδ→0(uˆ
k
a + δ) = uˆ
k
a. Similarly, the construction of
p¯0t implies that ua = u¯(β˜
0): If the consumer is fooled, she expects to receive surplus identical
to her outside option u¯(β˜0). Again, by choosing ua arbitrarily close but above u¯(β˜0),
ua = limδ→0(ua + δ) = u¯(β˜), the firm can guarantee that the consumer enters its store with
certainty. To prove that the firm can sell qt at pt = p¯t(q
0
t ) it remains be shown that—given
distortion (θa, θt)—there exists an attraction product with qa > 0 s.t. Eβ˜0
%
uˆkt
&
< Eβ˜0
%
uˆka
&
:
the consumer expects to strictly prefer product a over t. Note that with qt and pt being
fixed, uˆkt = uˆ
k
a determines a one-to-one function between qa and pa. We are thus left with
only one degree of freedom. Consider the three possible cases listed in the lemma:
• Assume that (θa, θt) = (Q,Q). PCC holds with strict inequality iff qt > qa and pt > pa.
Pick qa ∈ (0, q
0
t ), which exists by construction. For example, choose qa = q. Then
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qa < qt and by uˆ
k
t = uˆ
k
a ⇔ pa = pt − β(qt − qa) < pt: PCC holds with strict inequality.
(q.e.d.)
• Assume that (θa, θt) = (P, P ). PCC holds with strict inequality iff pt < pa and qt < qa.
Pick pa > p¯t(q
0
t ), which exists by construction. For example, choose pa = b. Then
pa > pt and by uˆ
k
t = uˆ
k
a ⇔ qa = qt + β(pa − pt) > qt: PCC holds with strict inequality.
(q.e.d.)
• Assume that (θa, θt) ∈ {(P,Q), (P,N), (N,Q)}.
1. If (θa, θt) = (P,Q), PCC holds with strict inequality iff qt+pa > 0 and qa+pt > 0.
Pick pa > 0 sufficiently large, s.t. by uˆ
k
t = uˆ
k
a ⇔ qa = β(q
0
t + pa)− p¯t(q
0
t ) > 0. For
example, choose pa = b. Then qt + pa > 0 and qa + pt > 0 by construction: PCC
holds with strict inequality. (q.e.d.)
2. If (θa, θt) = (P,N), PCC holds with strict inequality iff pa > 0 and qa−qt+pt > 0.
Pick pa > 0 sufficiently large, s.t. by uˆ
k
t = uˆ
k
a ⇔ qa = βpa + qt − p¯t(q
0
t ) > 0. For
example, choose pa = b. Then pa > 0 and qa − qt + pt = βpa > 0 by construction:
PCC holds with strict inequality. (q.e.d.)
3. If (θa, θt) = (N,Q), PCC holds with strict inequality iff qt > 0 and qa−pa+pt > 0.
Pick pa > 0 sufficiently large, s.t. by uˆ
k
t = uˆ
k
a ⇔ qa = pa + βqt − p¯t(q
0
t ) > 0. For
example, choose pa = b. Then qt > 0 and qa − pa + pt = βqt > 0 by construction:
PCC holds with strict inequality. (q.e.d.)
This concludes the proof for part b).
Proof of Proposition 1 (Sophistication/pessimism induces the rational outcome).
Let β > 1 (consumers are context-sensitive). Assume that β˜ ≥ β for all consumers.
We first derive the (unique) best response for a generic firm k conditional on attracting
a positive share of consumers under the assumption that b → ∞. Fix the competitor offer
(M−k,Θ−k) and let u¯(β˜) ≥ 0 be type β˜’s expected maximum surplus attainable outside of
firm k. By Lemma 3, fooling pessimistic types β˜ > β is not profitable: The firm can sell
any quality qt ≥ q at a strictly higher price if a
k(β˜) = tk for all β˜. Also, sophisticated
consumers cannot be fooled. It follows that if β˜ ≥ β for all consumers, a firm can sell
any target tk at a strictly higher profit if it does not fool. So assume that the firm does
not fool. Then all consumers correctly expect to buy the target when entering firm k and
the demand of firm k depends entirely on the characteristics of this target, qt and pt. Let
D(qt, pt) ∈ [0, 1] be the corresponding demand function of firm k. The profit of firm k is
then πk(qt, pt) = D(qt, pt)[pt − c(qt)] and depends only on the characteristics of product t:
41
Offering more than this product is unnecessary yet costly and cannot be part of the best
response. Fix quality qt and pt at a strictly positive demand D¯ = D(q¯t, p¯t). Note that
D¯ = D(q¯t, p¯t) = D(q¯t + ∆q, p¯t + ∆q) > 0, for any increment in quality ∆q ∈ R, because
u¯t = q¯t+∆q−(p¯t+∆q) = q¯t− p¯t. Solving for the profit-maximizing ∆q, argmax∆q π
k(∆q) =
D¯[p¯t+∆q− c(q¯t+∆q)], yields the condition c
′(q¯t+∆q) = 1. In other words, for any positive
demand D¯, the profit-maximizing quality to sell is defined by c(qt) = 1, i.e., qt = q
∗.
This interior solution is valid by assumption that q < q∗. Because profits (conditional on
not fooling) depend on the outside valuation (undistorted surplus) ut, distorting context
at the store is unnecessary yet costly and cannot be part of the best response. It follows
that the unique best response is to offer one undistorted product with quality qt = q
∗,
θt = N at price pt = argmaxp∈RD(q
∗ − p)[p − c(q∗)] (and no other products). Market
supply in any equilibrium must follow this rule: If a firm with a positive market share would
choose differently,—by the uniqueness of the best response derived above—there would exist
a deviation incentive. The only other response that can be profit-maximizing is to choose
(Mk,Θk) = ∅, i.e., to not supply any products, which yields zero profits. Note that best
response behavior is near-identical to the rational benchmark: Firms behave as if consumers
were rational but (possibly) heterogeneous in their outside options u¯(β˜). However, at any
point of mutual best response, u¯(β˜) = u¯ ∀β˜ ≥ β: If no firm fools, all consumers must expect
to yield the same maximum surplus. Once u¯ is unique, the unique best response conditional
on attracting a positive share of consumers collapses to (Mk,Θk) = ((q∗, q∗− u¯), (θkt = N))—
identical to the best response in the rational benchmark. Hence, the competitive equilibrium
must conform to the equilibrium derived in Lemma 1. The remainder of the proof is identical
to the second part of the proof of Lemma 1 and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Fooling Equilibrium).
Part a) (Store-Wide Distortions). We begin the proof by considering a perfectly
homogeneous, optimistic consumer population with unique type β˜0 < β. Consider a generic
firm k. Fix the competitor offer (M−k,Θ−k) and let u¯ = u¯(β˜0) ≥ 0 be type β˜0’s expected
maximum surplus attainable outside of firm k. Assume that for any two products j, i at
firm k, θkj = θ
k
i = θ
k and the firm chooses θk ∈ {Q,P,N}. Assume (for now) that b → ∞.
Consider the best response conditional on attracting a positive share of consumers. By
Lemma 3, the best response will involve fooling and the distortion of context. This yields
strictly higher profits than not fooling and choosing θk = N . Hence, the best response will
involve choosing either θk = Q or θk = P . We will now derive the two equilibrium candidates
that derive from assuming either θk = Q or θk = P .
• Assume that θk = Q. The maximum price the firm can sell any target quality qt is
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given by the upper bound p¯t(qt) which we have derived in the proof of Lemma 3. To
achieve p¯t(qt), offering a second product a ∕= t is necessary and sufficient. Holding
more than 2 products is unnecessary yet costly and can thus not be part of the best
response. If θk = Q ⇒ (θa, θt) = (Q,Q), by (the proof of) Lemma 3, the firm sells
qt at pt = p¯t(qt) iff it chooses qa < qt and pa < pt. If (θa, θt) = (Q,Q), p¯t(qt) can be
rewritten as
p¯t(qt, qa, pa) = β(qt − qa) + pa,
under the condition qa − pa = u¯ (the participation constraint binds). To find the best
response, we need to choose qt and (qa, pa) such that profit at this price is maximized.
Consider the choice of qt first. Because quality qt is inflated by a factor β when
(θa, θt) = (Q,Q), it is easy to see that the cost-efficient quality to sell is
qt = q
Q := argmax
q
[βq − c(q)]⇔ c′(qQ) = β.
This interior solution is valid by assumption qQ > q. We are left with the choice
of the attraction product (qa, pa). Maximizing profit for any qt implies maximizing
p¯t(qt, qa, pa) under the constraint q − pa = u¯. There are 2 opposing forces: Minimizing
qa and maximizing pa. The profit-maximizing choice is to minimize qa: Because quality
qa is inflated at the store, the positive effect on profits of decreasing quality qa is larger
than the positive effect of increasing price pa. The unique profit-maximizing choice is
therefore to choose qa = q, which implies pa = q − u¯. Note that this choice satisfies
the fooling conditions qa < qt and pa < pt for any qt > 0. For later reference, note the
“marketing” implications of this best-response: To attract consumers, the firm fixes
attraction quality qa = q and competes with other firms on the price of this low-quality
product. We conclude: Conditional on θk = Q, the best response in the domain of
positive profits is unique and continuous: the firm offers 2 products, t and a ∕= t, with
(qt, pt) = (q
Q, p¯t(q
Q)) and (qa, pa) = (q, q − u¯).
• Assume that θk = P . Analogously to the case of θk = Q, we find the best response by
maximizing profit at price p¯t(qt) which we can now express as
p¯t(qt, qa, pa) = pa −
1
β
(qa − qt)
under the condition qa− pa = u¯ (the participation constraint binds). 2 products, t and
a ∕= t are necessary and sufficient to yield this maximum price for any target quality qt.
Holding more products cannot be part of a best response. By (the proof of) Lemma 3,
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the firm sells qt at pt = p¯t(qt) iff it chooses qa > qt and pa > pt. With price of the
target being inflated at the store, the cost-efficient quality to sell is
qt = q
P := argmax
q
[q − βc(q)]⇔ c′(qP ) =
1
β
.
This interior solution is valid by assumption qP ≥ q. Maximizing profit for any qt
implies maximizing p¯t(qt, qa, pa) under the constraint qa − pa = u¯. There are 2 opposing
forces: Minimizing qa and maximizing pa. Contrary to the case of θ
k = Q, the profit-
maximizing choice now is to maximize pa: Because price pa is inflated at the store,
the positive effect on profits of increasing price pa is larger than the positive effect of
decreasing quality qa. The unique profit-maximizing choice is therefore to choose pa =
b, which implies qa = b+ u¯. Note that this choice satisfies the fooling conditions pa > pt
and qa > qt for any pt < b. For later reference, note the “marketing” implications of
this best-response: To attract consumers, the firm fixes attraction price pa = b and
competes with other firms on the quality of this high-price product. We conclude:
Conditional on θk = P , the best response in the domain of positive profits is unique
and continuous: the firm offers 2 products, t and a ∕= t, with (qt, pt) = (q
P , p¯t(q
P )) and
(qa, pa) = (b+ u¯, b).
Note that the best response in both cases is independent of the degree of na¨ıvete´ of type
β˜0 < β: Due to the optimality condition uˆkt = uˆ
k
a (the IC binds), any consumer with be-
lief β˜ < β (falsely) believes to purchase product a with certainty. The best response does
not generate heterogeneous expectations among a purely optimistic consumer population. If
firms play mutual best responses, any heterogeneity in types β˜ is therefore rendered unim-
portant for market supply: Uniqueness of the best response (given a distortion θk) implies
that firms generating positive demand must choose according to it; otherwise, there would
exists a strict deviation incentive. This response does not generate heterogeneous expecta-
tions. Firms not generating positive demand, on the other hand, choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅ to
avoid positive costs and thus negative profits. These firms do not generate heterogeneous
expectations either. It follows that in any equilibrium, u¯(β˜) = u¯ ∀β˜ < β: the outside option
is a unique value. We can find market supply in the competitive equilibrium by searching
for u¯ that equates the best response profits to zero. This yields the following two candidates
for equilibrium market supply:
θk = Q, (qt, pt) = (q
Q, c(qQ)), (qa, pa) = (q, c(q
Q)− β(qQ − q))(Q∗)
θk = P, (qt, pt) = (q
P , c(qP )), (qa, pa) = (q
P + [b− c(qP )], b)(P ∗)
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By reasoning analogous to the second part of the proof of Lemma 1, at least 2 firms must
provide a product-line according to (Q∗) or (P ∗). These firms share the market. All other
firms choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅. Fix an equilibrium where at least one firm chooses (Mk, θk)
according to (Q∗). Then there must be at least one other firm that provides the same
expected surplus u¯ = ua = q−c(q
Q)+β(qQ−q). Otherwise, the firm would have a deviation
incentive to strictly positive profits. What remains to be checked is a deviation towards the
other regime θk = P , where the maximum profit is given by the unique best response defined
above. In other words, the firm may offer 2 products, t and a ∕= t, with (qt, pt) = (q
P , p¯t(qt))
and (qa, pa) = (b+ u¯, b). There exists a strict deviation incentive iff, under this formulation,
qt − pt > 0. Rearranging, this is the case iff ν
(Q,Q) < ν(P,P ), where
ν(Q,Q) := (qQ − c(qQ)) + (β − 1)(qQ − q), and
ν(P,P ) := (qP − c(qP )) + (β − 1)(b− c(qP )).
Analogously, in an equilibrium where at least one firm plays according to (P ∗), firms have a
deviation incentive towards θk = Q iff ν(Q,Q) > ν(P,P ).
We conclude: A competitive equilibrium exists. In any such equilibrium, at least 2
firms share the market. These firms offer 2 products, t and a ∕= t. All other firms choose
(Mk,Θk) = ∅. The characteristics of t and a as well as θk are uniquely defined by (Q∗) iff
ν(Q,Q) > ν(P,P ) and by (P ∗) iff ν(Q,Q) < ν(P,P ). If ν(Q,Q) = ν(P,P ), any firm that supplies the
market chooses t and a according to either (Q∗) or (P ∗). As a final step, we can drop the
assumption that b→∞. In particular, our characterization is valid for any b ≥ c(qQ) > c(qP )
as assumed in the model section of this paper. This concludes the proof for part a) (Store-
Wide-Distortions).
Part b) (Product-Specific Distortions). Assume that firms choose θkj ∈ {Q,P,N}
for each product j ∈ Jk individually. The proof works similarly as the proof for part a).
We start again with the assumption of a homogeneous population with unique type β˜0 < β
and determine the best response conditional on attracting a positive market share under the
assumption that b → ∞. Fix the competitor offer (M−k,Θ−k) and let u¯ = u¯(β˜0) ≥ 0 be
type β˜0’s expected maximum surplus attainable outside of firm k. Fix some quality qt ≥ q.
By the proof of Lemma 3, the maximum price the firm can sell any qt is p¯t(qt). To sell
at this price, a second product a ∕= t is necessary and sufficient. Offering more products
is unnecessary yet costly and hence, cannot be part of the best response. Moreover, the
(in-store) valuation of at least one product j ∈ {a, t} must be distorted, in particular, with
any distortion (θa, θt) ∈ {(Q,Q), (P, P ), (P,Q), (P,N), (N,Q)}, a strictly higher price than
without fooling can be realized. It follows that the best response must involve one of these
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distortions. It is easy to see that choosing (θa, θt) = (P,Q) strictly dominates any other
choice of (θa, θt): No other distortion yields an overvaluation of the target relative to the
attraction product that is as extreme. This is of course reflected in p¯t(qt), which under the
condition that qa − pa = u¯ (the participation constraint binds) can be rewritten as
p¯t(qt, qa, pa) =
!""""""""""""#
""""""""""""$
βqt − qa + βpa if (θa, θt) = (P,Q)
qt − qa + βpa if (θa, θt) = (P,N)
βqt − qa + pa if (θa, θt) = (N,Q)
βqt − βqa + pa if (θa, θt) = (Q,Q)
1
β
qt −
1
β
qa + pa if (θa, θt) = (P, P ).
If (θa, θt) ∈ {(P, P ), (P,Q), (P,N), (N,Q)} (all except (θa, θt) = (Q,Q)), p¯t(qt, qa, pa) is
maximized by choosing pa = b (which implies qa = b + u¯). This choice satisfies all fooling
constraints: the consumer indeed enters the store of firm k and buys qt (see also the proof
of Lemma 3). Clearly, (θa, θt) = (P,Q) yields the highest price. To see the dominance of
(θa, θt) = (P,Q) over (θa, θt) = (Q,Q), note that p¯t(qt, qa, pa) is maximized under (θa, θt) =
(Q,Q) by choosing qa = q (which implies pa = qa − u¯). This is a feasible choice also when
(θa, θt) = (P,Q), which yields a strictly higher price. Hence, only (θa, θt) = (P,Q) can be
part of the best response.
Given 2 products t and a ∕= t as well as distortion (θa, θt) = (P,Q), we need to define the
profit-maximizing choice of (qt, pt) and (qa, pa). For any qt, the profit-maximizing price is
pt = p¯t(qt, qa, pa) as defined above. With quality being inflated at the store, the cost-efficient
choice of qt is
qt = q
Q := argmax
q
[βq − c(q)]⇔ c′(qQ) = β.
This interior solution is valid by assumption qQ > q. We have already noted above that
p¯t(qt, qa, pa) is maximized by choosing pa = b and thus, qa = b+u¯. While there are 2 opposing
forces when maximizing p¯t(qt, qa, pa)—minimizing qa and maximizing pa—, maximizing pa
is the dominant choice: Due to price pa being inflated at the store, a marginal increase
in price (accompanied by a marginal increase in quality) always yields a higher marginal
effect on profits than the equivalent decrease in quality. The “marketing” implication of
this choice is identical to the case of a purely price-inflated store (see case a), θk = P ):
Competition outside the store is on quality qa and not on price. It follows: Conditional on
attracting a positive share of consumers, the unique best response of firm k is to offer 2
products, t and a ∕= t, choose distortion Θk = (θa, θt) = (P,Q), and product-characteristics
(qt, pt) = (q
Q, p¯t(q
Q)) and (qa, pa) = (b+ u¯, b).
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Identical to part a) of this proof, the best response is independent of the degree of na¨ıvete´
of type β˜0 < β. Also, firms not generating positive demand choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅ to avoid
positive costs and thus negative profits. By analogous statements as those in part a) it
follows that at any point of mutual best response, any heterogeneity in types β˜ is rendered
unimportant for market supply. It follows that in any equilibrium, u¯(β˜) = u¯ ∀β˜ < β: the
outside option is a unique value. We can find market supply in the competitive equilibrium
by searching for u¯ that equates the profits in the best response defined above to zero. We
conclude: A competitive equilibrium exists. In any such equilibrium, at least 2 firms share
the market. These firms offer 2 products, t and a ∕= t. All other firms choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅.
For the firms that share the market, Θk and the characteristics of products a and t are
uniquely defined by
Θ
k = (θa, θt) = (P,Q), (qt, pt) = (q
Q, c(qQ)), (qa, pa) = (β(q
Q + b)− c(qQ), b).(PQ∗)
As a final step, we can drop the assumption that b→∞. In particular, our characterization
is valid for any b ≥ c(qQ) as assumed in the model section of this paper. This concludes the
proof for part b).
Proof of Proposition 3 (Fooling with Salience, Focusing, or Relative Thinking).
The proof is constructed as follows: We will first consider Assumption F (Focusing) and
Assumption RT (Relative Thinking). Both of these assumptions imply that distortions are
store-wide, i.e., for any two products j, i in Jk, θkj = θ
k
i = θ
k. Following Proposition 2,
if firms have a technology that allows for store-wide distortions, they will either want to
fool with (θa, θt) = (Q,Q) or (θa, θt) = (P, P ). We will show that if context is a function
of the product-line and follows Assumption F or Assumption RT, a firm can construct
(θa, θt) = (Q,Q) and (θa, θt) = (P, P ) and fool according to the best response defined in the
proof of Proposition 2 if and only if it introduces a third product to the product-line. In
other words, one decoy is necessary and sufficient to fool according to Proposition 2, part a).
We will then turn to Assumption S (Salience). This assumption allows firms to construct
product-specific distortions. Proposition 2, part b) has shown that if firms can choose θkj for
each product individually, they will want to fool with (θa, θt) = (P,Q). Again, we will show
that under Assumption S, the firm can construct such distortion and fool according to the
best response defined in the proof of Proposition 2 if and only if it introduces a third product
to the product-line. In other words, one decoy is necessary and sufficient to fool according
to Proposition 2, part b).
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Assumption F (Focusing).
Step 1: Fooling is not possible without a third product (a decoy is necessary).
Assume that Assumption F holds and that firm k offers only two products a and t, a ∕= t.
The firm may either fool with (θa, θt) = (Q,Q) or (θa, θt) = (P, P ).
• Assume that the firm fools with (θa, θt) = (Q,Q). We have shown in the proofs of
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 that fooling an optimistic consumer (β˜ < β) with (θa, θt) =
(Q,Q) implies ut < ua, qt > qa and pt > pa (the firm up-sells). Note that ut < ua ⇔
qt− qa < pt− pa. By Assumption F this implies that ∆
k
q < ∆
k
p, and thus, θ
k ∈ {P,N},
a contradiction.
• Assume that the firm fools with (θa, θt) = (P, P ). We have shown in the proofs of
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 that fooling an optimistic consumer (β˜ < β) with (θa, θt) =
(P, P ) implies ut < ua, qt < qa and pt < pa (the firm down-sells). Note that ut < ua ⇔
pa− pt < qa− qt. By Assumption F this implies that ∆
k
q > ∆
k
p, and thus, θ
k ∈ {Q,N},
a contradiction.
This concludes the proof of step 1. Note that this result is not an artefact of our rank-
based implementation of KS, but a generic characteristic of the Focusing framework, which
requires, by Assumption 1 in KS, that whenever preferences are shifted towards a product
that is dominant in one attribute (z), but not in the other (−z), ∆kz > ∆
k
−z, which is in
contradiction to fooling condition ut < ua.
Step 2: Fooling is always possible with a third product (a single decoy is
sufficient). Assume that Assumption F holds and that firm k offers three products, a, t,
and d. The firm may either fool with (θa, θt) = (Q,Q) or (θa, θt) = (P, P ).
• Assume that the firm wants to fool with (θa, θt) = (Q,Q). Fix any characteristics
(qa, pa) and (qt, pt) that imply that the consumer is fooled if (θa, θt) = (Q,Q). Then
ut < ua, qt > qa, and pt > pa. (For example, choose the characteristics defining the best
response in the proof of Proposition 2.) Choose pd = pt and qd < qt − (pt − pa)− κF .
20
Then by Assumption F, ∆kq − ∆
k
p > κF ⇔ θ
k = Q ⇒ (θa, θt) = (Q,Q). Note that
product d is strictly dominated by target t and thus, does not violate incentive compat-
ibility of the fooling regime: The firm can sell product t according to the best response
defined in the proof of Proposition 2.
20Recall from Assumption F that κF ≥ 0 is some (exogenously defined) threshold that measures the level
of stimulus necessary for a preference distortion.
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• Assume that the firm wants to fool with (θa, θt) = (P, P ). Fix any characteristics
(qa, pa) and (qt, pt) that imply that the consumer is fooled if (θa, θt) = (P, P ). Then
ut < ua, qt > qa, and pt > pa. (For example, choose the characteristics defining the best
response in the proof of Proposition 2.) Choose qd = qt and pd > pt + (qa − qt) + κF .
21
Then by Assumption F, ∆kp − ∆
k
q > κF ⇔ θ
k = P ⇒ (θa, θt) = (P, P ). Note that
product d is strictly dominated by target t and thus, does not violate incentive com-
patibility of the fooling regime: The firm can sell product t according to the best
response defined in the proof of Proposition 2.
This concludes the proof of step 2. Again, notice that this a result generic to the Focusing
framework and does not depend on the rank-based formulation of preferences that we have
assumed for our model. The Focusing framework assumes utility weights to be a function of
the attribute spread ∆kz . Most naturally, such spreads are open to manipulation by a single
option, i.e., a single decoy.
It follows that under Assumption F, the characterization of products a and t corresponds
to the equilibrium defined in Proposition 2, part a). Holding more than three products is
unnecessary yet costly which implies that the fooling equilibrium of Proposition 2 will be
realized with exactly three products of which one is a decoy.
Assumption RT (Relative Thinking).
Step 1: Fooling is not possible without a third product (a decoy is necessary).
We show that norming assumptions N1 and N2 in BRS imply that fooling is impossible with
only 2 products. The result then readily extends to Assumption RT. Attention weights in
BRS are a function of the spread of an attribute in the choice set, ∆z, z = q, p; we call
the weight function w(∆z). By N1, w(∆t) is strictly decreasing in ∆z. By N2, w(∆z)∆z is
strictly increasing in ∆z.
Suppose that firm k offers only two products, a and t. Fooling requires that ua > ut
(see Lemma 2) while inside the store uˆt ≥ uˆa by incentive compatibility (IC). We show that
the norming assumptions in BRS rule out such a preference change if a and t are the only
products in the product-line.
Assume ua > ut ⇔ qa − pa > qt − pt. Then either (1) qa > qt and pa > pt, or (2) qa < qt
and pa < pt, or (3) qa > qt and pa < pt. If (1) is true, then ua > ut ⇔ ∆q > ∆p. N2 then im-
plies w(∆q)∆q > w(∆p)∆p, which is equivalent to w(∆q)sa − w(∆p)pa > w(∆q)qt − w(∆p)pt.
Thus, the same product is preferred outside and inside the store and fooling is not possi-
ble. If (2) is true, ua > ut ⇔ ∆q < ∆p leads to a similar contradiction. Then N2 implies
21See the previous footnote.
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w(∆q)∆q < w(∆p)∆p and product a (now being the less qualitative option) will be preferred
both inside and outside the store. Finally, if (3) is true, product a dominates product t
in both attributes implying that a is strictly preferred over t for any (positive) attribute
weights. Again, product a is preferred both inside and outside the store and fooling is not
possible.
These results readily extend to Assumption RT. Case (3) is immediate. For case (1),
note that t is the less-qualitative product. A preference change towards t would thus require
θk = P , that is, ∆q
∆p
> κRT ≥ β.
22 But with only two products spanning the attribute range
∆q, ∆q > β∆p implies that the product with higher quality is preferred at the store. That
is, uˆka > uˆ
k
t , which contradicts incentive compatibility (IC). With case (2) we get a similar
contradiction. This concludes the proof of step 1.
Step 2: Fooling is always possible with a third product (a single decoy is
sufficient). Assume that Assumption RT holds and that firm k offers three products, a, t,
and d. The firm may either fool with (θa, θt) = (Q,Q) or (θa, θt) = (P, P ).
• Assume that the firm wants to fool with (θa, θt) = (Q,Q). Fix any characteristics
(qa, pa) and (qt, pt) that imply that the consumer is fooled if (θa, θt) = (Q,Q). Then
ut < ua, qt > qa, and pt > pa. (For example, choose the characteristics defining the best
response in the proof of Proposition 2.) Choose qd = qt and pd > pa+κRT (qt−qa) > pt.
23
Then by Assumption RT,
∆kp
∆kq
> κRT ⇔ θ
k = Q⇒ (θa, θt) = (Q,Q). Note that product
d is strictly dominated by target t and thus, does not violate incentive compatibility of
the fooling regime: The firm can sell product t according to the best response defined
in the proof of Proposition 2.
• Assume that the firm wants to fool with (θa, θt) = (P, P ). Fix any characteristics
(qa, pa) and (qt, pt) that imply that the consumer is fooled if (θa, θt) = (P, P ). Then
ut < ua, qt < qa, and pt < pa. (For example, choose the characteristics defining the
best response in the proof of Proposition 2.) Choose pd = pt and qd < qa−κRT (pa−pt),
which implies qd < qt. Then by Assumption RT,
∆kq
∆kp
> κRT ⇔ θ
k = P ⇒ (θa, θt) =
(P, P ). Note that product d is strictly dominated by target t and thus, does not violate
incentive compatibility of the fooling regime: The firm can sell product t according to
the best response defined in the proof of Proposition 2.
This concludes the proof of step 2. Similar to the Focusing framework, this result is
generic to the model by BRS and does not depend on our rank-based implementation. The
22Recall from Assumption RT that κRT ≥ β is some (exogenously defined) threshold that measures the
level of stimulus necessary for a preference distortion.
23See the previous footnote.
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framework of Relative Thinking assumes utility weights to be a function of the attribute
spread ∆ka. Most naturally, such spreads are open to manipulation by a single option, i.e., a
single decoy.
It follows that under Assumption RT, the characterization of products a and t corresponds
to the equilibrium defined in Proposition 2, part a). Holding more than three products is
unnecessary yet costly which implies that the fooling equilibrium of Proposition 2 will be
realized with exactly three products of which one is a decoy.
Assumption S (Salience)
We have shown in the proof of Proposition 2 that if firms can choose θkj for each product
individually, the unique weakly undominated best response is to fool with a ∕= t and choose
(θa, θt) = (P,Q). We show that under Assumption S, this choice is possible iff the firm adds
a third product (i.e., a single decoy) to the product-line.
Step 1: A decoy is necessary. The specifications of products a and t that a best-
responding firm will choose are given in the proof of Proposition 2. We show that a distortion
(θa, θt) = (P,Q) with these product specifications cannot be constructed without the help of
additional (decoy) products. Note first that the specification Proposition 2 implies qa > qt
and pa > pt. Thus, none of the two products is dominated. Suppose that the firm only holds
these two products. Then the reference quality is given by zkR =
(qa+qt)
2
and the reference
price is given by pkR =
(pa+pt)
2
. Because (qj − q
k
R)(pj − p
k
R) > 0 for j ∈ {a, f}, we can exploit
Proposition 1 in BGS: The “advantageous” attribute of product j—higher quality or lower
price relative to the reference—is overweighted if and only if qj
pj
>
qk
R
pk
R
. Also, iff qj
pj
<
qk
R
pk
R
, then
the “disadvantageous” attribute of product j is overweighted, while iff qj
pj
=
qk
R
pk
R
, consumers
weigh both attributes equally.
Assume towards a contradiction that the firm can construct (θa, θt) = (P,Q). For t being
quality-salient, by qt < q
k
R and Proposition 1 in BGS,
qt
pt
<
qkR
pkR
⇔
qt
pt
<
qa
pa
.
But for a being price-salient, by qa > q
k
R and Proposition 1 in BGS,
qa
pa
<
qkR
pkR
⇔
qt
pt
>
qa
pa
,
a contradiction. This concludes the proof of step 1.
51
Step 2: A single decoy is sufficient. Assume that firm k wants to fool using distortion
(θa, θt) = (P,Q) and chooses the specifications of product a and t according to the best-
response defined in the proof of Proposition 2 part b). Note that by this specification
qa > qt ≥ q > 0 and pa > pt > 0.
• Assume that qt
pt
> qa
pa
. We construct a reference point using one additional product d
that satisfies the following properties: (1) pkR = pt, (2) q
k
R < qt and (3)
qa
pa
<
qk
R
pk
R
< qt
pt
.
The construction is illustrated in Figure II. With such a reference point,
1. Product t is quality-salient: By pkR = pt, the salience of pt is σ(pt, pt). By homo-
geneity of degree zero, σ(αpt,αpt) = σ(pt, pt) for any α > 0. Let α =
qt
pt
> 0,
then σ(pt, pt) = σ(qt, qt). By ordering, σ(qt, qt) < σ(qt, q
k
R) because q
k
R < qt. Thus,
σ(qt, q
k
R) > σ(pt, p
k
R): product t is quality-salient.
2. Product a is price-salient: By qkR < qt < qa and p
k
R = pt < pa, (qa−q
k
R)(pa−p
k
R) >
0, and product a neither dominates nor is dominated by the reference good. Thus,
Proposition 1 in BGS applies. Because qa > q
k
R, by
qk
R
pk
R
> qa
pa
, product a is price-
salient.
To satisfy property (1), choose pd = 2pt − pa, which implies pd < pt. To satisfy
property (2) and (3), choose qd < 2qt − qa, which implies qd < qt. It remains to
be shown that the decoy d does not violate fooling conditions. Note that qd − pd <
2qt − q − a − (2pt − pa) ⇔ ud < 2ut − ua. Because ut < ua by the specifications of a
and t, this implies that ud < ut < ua. We first show that IC is not violated: Because
t is quality-salient, uˆkt = βqt − pt > ut. But then, if (i) θ
k
d = N , uˆ
k
t > uˆ
k
d follows from
uˆkt > ut > ud = uˆ
k
d, if (ii) θ
k
d = Q, uˆ
k
t > uˆ
k
d follows from qd < qt, pd < pt and ut > ud,
if (iii) θkd = P , then uˆ
k
t > uˆ
k
d iff uˆ
k
a > uˆ
k
d ⇔ qa − qd > β(pa − pd) by uˆ
k
t = uˆ
k
a. To
prove that qa − qd > β(pa − pd), note that qa − qd > qa − (2qt − qa) = 2(qt − qa) by
qd < 2qt− qa and pa− pd = pa− (2pt− pa) by pd = 2pt− pa. Thus qa− qd > β(pa− pd)
if 2(qa − qt) > 2β(pa − pt) ⇔ (qa − qt) > β(pa − pt). But the latter inequality is true
by uˆkt = uˆ
k
a ⇔ qa− βqt = βpa− pt. Thus, uˆ
k
t > uˆ
k
d. Finally, we have to show that PCC
is not violated, i.e., that Eβ˜
%
uˆka
&
> Eβ˜
%
uˆkd
&
. To see that this is true note that we have
shown that ua > ut > ud and uˆ
k
a = uˆ
k
t > uˆ
k
d. Because Eβ˜
%
uˆka
&
is between uˆka and ua and
Eβ˜
%
uˆkd
&
is between uˆkd and ud (both by β˜ < β) it follows that Eβ˜
%
uˆka
&
> Eβ˜
%
uˆkd
&
.
• Assume that qt
pt
< qa
pa
. We construct a reference point using one additional product d
that satisfies the following properties: (1) qkR = qa, (2) p
k
R > pa and (3)
qa
pa
>
qk
R
pk
R
> qt
pt
.
The construction is illustrated in Figure II. With such a reference point,
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1. Product t is quality-salient: By qkR > qt and p
k
R > qt, (qt − q
k
R)(pt − p
k
R) > 0,
and product t neither dominates nor is dominated by the reference good. Thus,
Proposition 1 in BGS applies. Because qt < q
k
R, by
qk
R
pk
R
> qt
pt
, product t is quality-
salient.
2. Product a is price-salient: By qkR = qa, the salience of qa is σ(qa, qa). By homo-
geneity of degree zero, σ(αqa,αqa) = σ(qa, qa) for any α > 0. Let α =
pa
qa
> 0,
then σ(qa, qa) = σ(pa, pa). By ordering, σ(pa, pa) < σ(pa, p
k
R) because p
k
R > qt.
Thus, σ(qa, q
k
R) < σ(pa, p
k
R): product a is price-salient.
To satisfy property (1) choose qd = 2qa − qt > qa. To satisfy property (2) and (3),
choose pd > 2pa− pt. It remains to be shown that the decoy d does not violate fooling
conditions. But note that pd > pa = b: The decoy has a price above the maximum
willingness to pay and thus, will never be chosen (and can therefore not violate fooling
conditions).
This concludes the proof of step 2. We conclude: Under Assumption S, the characteri-
zation of products a and t corresponds to the equilibrium defined in Proposition 2, part b).
Holding more than three products is unnecessary yet costly which implies that the fooling
equilibrium of Proposition 2 will be realized with exactly three products of which one is a
decoy.
Proof of Proposition 4 (Equilibrium with Fooling and Non-Fooling Firms).
The result is trivial if either all consumers are optimistic or all consumers are sophisti-
cated/pessimistic. These cases were covered by our earlier Propositions. So assume that
there exists a positive mass of consumers with beliefs β˜ < β and a positive mass of con-
sumers with beliefs β˜ ≥ β.
Let β > 1. Fix a market offering according to the Proposition. There exists two types
of stores with strictly positive demand, kL and kH . Type kL is a fooling firm that supplies
products according to the equilibrium defined in Proposition 2 and kH is a non-fooling firm
that supplies products according to the equilibrium defined in Proposition 1. There exists
at least 2 firms of each type. All other firms choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅. All firms make zero
profits. Note that conditional on purchasing at type kH , all consumers expect to purchase q∗
at price p∗ = c∗. At the same time, conditional on purchasing at type kL, all sophisticated
and pessimistic consumers (correctly) expect to purchase the target at the fooling firms
(see Lemma 2 for a proof), while all optimists (falsely) expects to purchase the attraction
product. We prove that a competitive equilibrium with this market supply exists and that
it defines the unique competitive market supply.
53
Existence. Assume that we have an equilibrium. Firms of type kL fool and sell quality
qt ∕= q
∗ at pt = c(qt) to the optimists, while firms of type k
H are truthful and sell q∗ at
p∗ = c∗ to the sophisticates/pessimists. We have to check whether consumers or firms want
to deviate. Consider first the optimistic population that are assumed to purchase at kL.
They have the alternative to purchase (q∗, c∗) at kH instead of (qa, pa) at k
L (of course, they
only expect to buy product a, while they really buy the target t). However, because ua > u
∗
in the candidate equilibrium defined above, purchasing at kL always promises a higher payoff
and optimists will not switch to kH :
1. Consider an equilibrium according to Proposition 2 part b). Then
ua = qa − pa = β(q
Q + b)− cQ − b. Note that (β − 1)b > 0 by β > 1. Strict
convexity of the cost function then implies βqQ − qQ > βq∗ − c∗ > q∗ − c∗ and thus,
ua > u
∗.
2. Consider an equilibrium according to Proposition 2 part a) where (θa, θt) = (Q,Q).
Then ua = qa − pa = q − c
Q + β(qQ − q). Note that by assumption, q < q∗ and thus,
ua > q
∗−cQ+β(qQ−q∗) by β > 1. It follows that ua > u
∗ because q∗−cQ+β(qQ−q∗) >
q∗ − c∗ ⇔ βqQ − cQ > βq∗ − c∗ by strict convexity of the cost-function.
3. Consider an equilibrium according to Proposition 2 part a) where (θa, θt) = (P, P ).
Then ua = qa − pa = q
P + (βb − cP ) − b and ua > u
∗ ⇔ qP − βcP + βb− b > q∗ − c∗
⇔ qP/β − cP + (1− 1/β)b > q∗/β − c∗ + (1− 1/β)c∗. Note first that b > c∗, so (1 −
1/β)b > (1− 1/β)c∗. Strict convexity of the cost function further implies that qP/β −
cP > s∗/β − c∗. So ua > u
∗.
Pessimists also do not want to switch to kL. They correctly expect to buy product t at kL
(for a proof see Lemma 2) which yields surplus ut = qt−c(qt). Because q
∗ = argmax(q−c(s))
and qt ∕= q
∗ by strict convexity of c(q), u∗ = q∗ − c∗ > ut and shopping at type k
H yields
higher surplus. Finally, firms of either type have no incentive to deviate. By Proposition 2,
no firm can find a more profitable strategy when serving optimistic agents if there are at
least 2 firms of type kL. By Proposition 1, no firm can find a more profitable strategy when
serving pessimistic agents if there are at least 2 firms of type kH . The only strategy that
yields non-negative profits when not generating demand is (Mk,Θk) = ∅. This strategy yields
zero profits as well and thus, does not constitute a deviation incentive. Hence, this is an
equilibrium. Note also that any firm that is not of type kL or kH must choose (Mk,Θk) = ∅
by above reasoning, confirming part c) of the proposition. (q.e.d.)
Uniqueness. The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, respectively, show that unless there
exist at least 2 firms supplying products according to Proposition 1 as well as at least 2 firms
54
supplying products according to Proposition 2, there exists a deviation incentive to a strategy
with strictly positive profits. In particular, by the uniqueness and continuity of the best
response conditional on attracting only sophisticated/pessimistic consumers (Proposition 1),
there must exist at least 2 firms supplying a product with expected surplus u¯H ≥ u∗ =
q∗ − c(q∗) to consumers of type β˜ ≥ β. Otherwise, at least one firm could attract the entire
population of types β˜ ≥ β at strictly positive profit. Similarly, there must exist at least
2 firms supplying a product with expected surplus u¯L ≥ ua = qa − pa to consumers of
type β˜ < β, where qa and pa are defined by the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2.
Otherwise, at least one firm could attract the entire population of types β˜ < β at strictly
positive profit. By the strict difference of ua and u
∗ (in particular, ua > u
∗, see the existence
proof above), 1 firm cannot satisfy both of these conditions at the same time (attracting
both groups of consumers with positive probability), even if it would play a mixed strategy:
Such a firm would either have to make negative profits in expectation (to attract both groups
without generating a deviation incentive for other firms) or generate an offer that (for at least
one of the two groups of consumers) could be profitably undercut by other firms. It follows
that at least 2 firms satisfying the respective condition must exist for each group separately.
Because each firm only serves one group of consumers, the only possibility to satisfy the
respective condition without making negative profit is for each firm to choose market supply
according to Propositions 1 and 2, respectively. It follows that any competitive equilibrium
must have the characteristics listed in the Proposition. (q.e.d.)
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